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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
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Legislators during State Legislative Deliberations 
 
By 
Renita Miller 
 
In this dissertation I systematically examine African-American and Latino 
legislator behavior in a legislative setting. The project specifically examines whether and 
how minority legislators represent and influence African American and Latino policy 
interests during the legislative process.  I perform an analysis of minority legislator 
participation rates on bills and develop an original measure of substantive representation 
using patterns in legislative speech of state representatives’ language during committee 
hearings.   I build on existing theory in the representation literature and offer new 
hypotheses for expanding the scope of how substantive representation is defined and 
investigated, namely through an empirical investigation of the link between deliberation 
and descriptive representation.  Second, I collect an original data set and develop an 
original measure of substantive representation to test these hypotheses with participation 
rates and a linguistic frame based content analysis approach of minority and non-minority 
representatives’ language on bills for racial perspectives during state legislative 
committee hearings on several policy issue areas including, but not limited to education, 
healthcare, and immigration.  Third, I offer a critical test of hypotheses to test whether 
African American and Latino representatives’ (1) participate more when the legislation is 
deemed minority interest in comparison to their non-minority counterparts? (2) their 
behavior (or deliberation style) is different from non-minority legislators? (3) impact the 
deliberation style of non-minority legislators?  
 
The analysis draws on original data collected through committee hearing tapes 
and online video archives of Texas committee hearings in multiple policy areas, and the 
findings indicate that minority legislators do indeed provide a voice for minority 
constituents, providing more minority interest language on minority interest bills in 
comparison to their nonminority colleagues, especially when the legislation is threatening 
to minority populations. These results support the argument that minority legislators do 
indeed substantively represent minority constituents at levels greater than non-minority 
representatives during the legislative process.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
                                                           
 
On July 22, 1993 Carol Moseley Braun, the first and only African American senator 
solely contested patenting the Confederate flag as the insignia of the United Daughters of 
the Confederacy.  Senator Braun passionately objected to patenting this symbol because 
she noted that it was a reminder to the descendents of slaves of the horrors they suffered. 
As she stood in chambers she professed that the confederate symbol “is something that 
has no place in modern times, no place in this body, no place in our society” 
(Congressional Record July 22, 1993).   Her passionate appeal led to the reversal of the 
approval votes (52-48) to an ultimate defeat of (75-25).  Vice President Jo Biden, then 
Senator of Delaware, stated "I think you saw here today on the floor of the Senate one of 
the reasons why I and others have been saying for so long there is a need for diversity in 
this body" (Congressional Record July 22, 1993).  He went on to state that, "the fact of 
the matter is that the senator from Illinois has pointed out something that has been sorely 
missing from this body - that one single voice speaking for millions and millions of 
voices in this country who feel like this body doesn't understand their problems” 
(Congressional Record July 22, 1993).  
The referencing of this account provides the backdrop for my central research 
question “Does descriptive representation lead to substantive representation?” or in more 
specific terms “What is the impact of minority1 legislators on legislation and the 
legislative process?” In this case, the argument can be made that had Senator Braun not 
been there, the measure would have been approved and sailed through the Senate without 
deliberation. It was evident that the senator provided a voice during the legislative 
                                                 
1
 Minority = African American and Latino state legislators only 
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process for an issue that was relevant to minorities.  Yet, very little is known about 
minorities and the deliberative process and hardly any studies have empirically examined 
it (Canon 1999; Orey 2007; Gamble 2005; 2007).  
The minority population in the United States continues to grow rapidly with this 
growth more minorities have entered into legislative politics across all electoral 
institutions, particularly state legislatures, which suggests that their increased numbers 
will offer minorities more opportunities to impact the policy making process on behalf of 
minority populations. Therefore, understanding “how” minority representatives may or 
may not substantively represent minority interests is desirable and lacking.  Hence, this 
dissertation seeks to systematically examine African-American and Latino legislator 
behavior and “how” they represent and influence African American and Latino policy 
interests during the legislative process, in order to address the gap in the representation 
literature with regard to the deliberative process.  As a result, this dissertation will focus 
on two broad questions: First, does descriptive representation result in substantive 
representation? Second, what representational role do African American and Latino state 
legislators play in the state legislative policy making process?  This dissertation will also 
focus on three more refined research questions:  
(1) Do minorities participate more when the legislation is deemed racial in    
comparison to their non-minority counterparts?  
(2) Is there behavior (or deliberation style) different from non-minority legislators? 
If so, under what conditions? and  
(3) Do African Americans and Latinos impact the deliberation style of non-minority 
legislators?  
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In this chapter I discuss the arguments set forth in the minority representation 
literature, where this dissertation fits in with the current literature, and how I will expand 
upon current theories and methods of representation as they relate to minority substantive 
representation.  In addition, I will provide a brief summary of the upcoming chapters. 
 
MINORITY REPRESENTATION LITERATURE: A SUCCINCT ASSESSMENT 
One basis for answering the questions outlined in the beginning of this chapter is 
found in the debate in the minority representation literature concerning descriptive and 
substantive representation.  Using Pitkin’s (1967) framework for defining representation 
as a guide, I will determine whether or not minority state legislators are “acting for” 
(substantive representation) rather than just “standing for” (descriptive representation) 
minority interests. The theoretical underpinnings for this project considers substantive 
representation which suggests that descriptive representatives who share unique 
experiences and backgrounds with minority constituents act as stronger advocates for 
minority group interests in comparison with non-minority legislators (Hero and Tolbert 
1995; Mansbridge 1999; Pitkin 1967; Bratton and Haynie 1999; Grose 2005; Whitby 
1997; Lublin 1999; Karnig and Welch 1980; Meier, Stewart and England 1989; Meier 
and Stewart 1991).   
While many studies have found that race or ethnicity plays an important role in 
determining the probability of legislators to support minority group interests (Cameron, 
Epstein and O’Halloran 1996; Canon 1999; Lublin 1997; Tate 2003; Welch and Hibbing 
1984; and Whitby 1997), other scholars have found that race or ethnicity does not 
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influence whether or not members will support these policies (Hero and Tolbert 1995; 
Swain 1993).  A significant portion of the research that examines the impact that race has 
on substantive representation of minority interests involve bill sponsorship and 
constituency service (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Canon 1999; Hall 1996; Haynie 2001; 
Sinclair Chapman 2003), but a major part of our knowledge on race and substantive 
representation has developed from the analysis of roll call voting (Cameron, Epstein and 
O’Halloran 1996; Canon 1999; Hood and Morris 1998; Lublin 1997; Overby and 
Cosgrove 1996; Sharpe and Garand 2001; Swain 1993; Tate 2003; Whitby 1997).  To 
understand the differences in findings, we need to examine the various aspects of 
behavior being examined.  
African American state legislators have been found since the beginning of their 
entry into state legislative careers to assemble their agendas around the needs and 
interests of the African American community. For example, Sokolow (1971) finds that 
African Americans in the California state legislature introduced a large number of bills 
on crime, welfare, education, and health. Evident is how these issues overwhelmingly 
impact the African American community in comparison to their white counterparts, as 
African Americans tend to have health concerns that are unique to African Americans 
(Kahn et al. 1994; Williams and Collins 1996; Woods 1996), they are more likely to live 
below the poverty line, be victims of violent crimes, and encounter discrimination in the 
areas of employment and housing (Hacker 1992; Massey and Denton 1993).  
Similarly, more recent research on Latino representatives finds that they too 
assemble their agendas around the needs and interests of the Latino community more 
broadly.  Specifically, the Latino population faces comparable challenges to African 
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Americans in that the poverty rate among Latinos is three times that of non Latino whites, 
and they are more likely to face challenges in education, health, and discrimination 
(Bratton 2006).  For example, as of 2007 the U.S. Department of Education finds that less 
than 8 percent of Latinos hold bachelors or advanced degrees (African Americans hold 
less than 10 percent), and even more astonishing, less than one fourth of Latinos (and 
African Americans) have completed high school.  In addition, Latinos face numerous 
challenges related to immigration, because as of 2000, about 39 percent of the Latino 
population in the United States was foreign born (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000).   
While these two groups have distinct racial differences, they both share an ethnic 
group consciousness which may play a significant role in determining policy preferences 
regarding ethnic issues because of their past experiences with discrimination and 
segregation, which extends to elected officials (Minta 2011).  For example, in 2010 
immigration reform was a hot button issue and created protests and political outrage at 
many levels, particularly the state level where many of these laws were being created. On 
multiple occasions African American and Latino state legislators banned together against 
these laws because they deemed them oppressive and a violation of civil rights. 
Particularly, the Arizona legislature passed a bill (SB1070) which allowed law 
enforcement to ask anyone for verification of immigrant status or risk jail time and 
possibly deportation under the guise of “reasonable suspicion”. This law set off major 
protests within and outside the Latino community. Many vehemently argued that this law 
would lead to racial profiling and discrimination. The National Black Caucus of State 
Legislators and the National Hispanic Caucus of State Legislators had planned a joint 
conference in Arizona but because of both organizations’ opposition to the law; it was 
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moved to another state. Similarly, Alabama passed House Bill 56 (HB56) passed during 
the 2011 legislative session which has the same provision for verification as SB1070, but 
goes further and prohibits illegal immigrants from receiving any state or local public 
benefits, attending any public university, renting to illegal immigrants, transporting or 
harboring illegal immigrants, and requires school officials determine immigration status 
of school children.   This bill has come under intensive scrutiny from both the African 
American and Latino community. Overall, differences do exist with regard to the degree 
African Americans and Latinos agree on the impact particular issues affect their 
respective populations like immigration, discrimination, and civil rights violations, but 
both groups are much closer in their perspectives compared to whites (Pew Research 
Study 2008).   
How has this knowledge of the construction of agendas translated into actual 
research that provides analysis involving rigorous hypothesis testing?  A significant 
portion of the research that examines the impact that race has on substantive 
representation of minority interests involves bill sponsorship (Bratton and Haynie 1999; 
Canon 1999; Hall 1996; Haynie 2001; Sinclair Chapman 2003; Bratton 2006; Rocca and 
Sanchez 2008). This research draws the conclusion that there is a lack of minority 
legislative influence (Rocca and Sanchez 2008). Consequently, substantive representation 
by African American and Latino legislators is depressed when bill sponsorship is the 
main explanatory variable. Grose (2011) argues that the primary reason for these findings 
is because scholars do not look beyond bill sponsorship and roll call voting activities.               
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A major part of our knowledge on race and substantive representation has 
developed from the analysis of roll call voting (Cameron, Epstein and O’Halloran 1996; 
Canon 1999; Hood and Morris 1998; Lublin 1997; Overby and Cosgrove 1996; Sharpe 
and Garand 2001; Swain 1993; Tate 2003; Whitby 1997).  Notably, the literature which 
examines roll call votes almost exclusively finds that non-minority representatives are 
equally capable of representing minority interests as well as minority representatives 
(Cameron, Epstein and O’Halloran 1996; Lublin 1997; Swain 1993). The implications of 
these findings suggest that the mechanisms set forth to increase minority representation 
may therefore be irrelevant and the advancement of minorities in political institutions in 
essence hold no value for the creation of policies that represent minority constituents. 
Therefore, a more thorough understanding of the substantive impact of minority 
legislators must include a more encompassing examination of legislative activity (Minta 
2011). Minta (2011) emphasizes that a legislator’s ability to substantively represent 
minorities can take place at different points of the legislative process, prior to roll call 
votes. More recently, Grose (2011, 9) in his study of African American congressional 
representatives suggests that “if we want to enhance substantive representation for black 
constituents, and conceive of it as roll-call voting, then electing black legislators is not 
very important. However, if we want to enhance service and project delivery to black 
constituents, then descriptive representation in Congress is crucial”. This dissertation 
argues that deliberation, defined as a decision making process that contains the following 
elements, including but not limited to, participants, information, and discussion (Bessette 
1994), is an important component of representation, and while representatives’ roll call 
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votes may be noteworthy, their participation and the words they speak are equally 
important (Canon 1999).   
Deliberation 
The deliberative aspects of the legislative process have been infrequently studied, 
yet its importance, especially for underrepresented groups, is conveyed by many political 
theorists.  For instance, normative theory suggests that deliberative efforts can change 
debates, agendas, and even preferences (Barber 1984; Sunstein 1993; Young 1993). 
Moreover, “increasing the number of minority voices represented by racially, ethnically, 
or aesthetically distinct individuals-enriches the policymaking environment” (Mansbridge 
1999).  Williams (1998) suggests that deliberation is most effective when marginalized 
constituencies are a part of the discussion. In order for policy decisions to be 
representative of these constituencies and good policy to be made, a full range of 
perspectives are necessary for individuals to fully understand the range of implications on 
policy (Williams 1998). Similarly, Mansbridge (1999, 634) points out that, “a 
representative body should ideally include at least one representative who can speak for 
every group that might provide new information, perspectives, or ongoing insights 
relevant to understanding that leads to decision”.   
 Consequently, Mansbridge (1999) emphasizes that when descriptive 
representation occurs, horizontal communication between legislators improves. Other 
things equal, descriptive representatives are more likely than non-descriptive 
representatives to act as their descriptive constituents would like them to act when 
making or changing policy.  Further she suggests that increases in the descriptive 
representation of minority voices can reduce the tendency to dismiss claims as 
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illegitimate or strange, and may buffer the effective use of institutional rules to advantage 
minorities.  In fact, if “these minority voices originate from persons having a mutually 
interactive relationship with disadvantaged groups and from sharing a commitment to 
dispossessed subgroups within said groups, representation and democracy are advanced 
even further” (Dovi 2002). The consequence of deliberation is compelling but not 
irrefutable. This dissertation will provide evidence to evaluate the normative claim 
regarding substantive representation of minorities by descriptive representatives.  
 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
Relevant Literature 
I argue that minority differences in behavior are best understood in light of research 
highlighting the impact of women in the legislature and how their behavior differs from 
men.  For instance, the idea that there is a strong connection between the gender of the 
representative and the type of representation women receive, in that the women 
legislators are the ones who speak for women and women interests in state legislators 
(Thomas 1991) in comparison to men legislators.  For example, Walsh (2002) examines 
floor debates of five pieces of salient legislation, two of which specifically deal with 
children, motherhood, and families.  She finds that “women more often than men mention 
the affect of legislation on underrepresented constituencies, and they bring to the floor 
firsthand experience of the difficulties that mothers face” (Walsh 2002).   
The literature on women and representation has evolved from findings which 
suggest that women state legislators were more likely to participate less with regard to 
bargaining, meeting with lobbyists and speaking in committees and on the floor than their 
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male counterparts (Diamond 1977; Kirkpatrick 1974) to a more recent dynamic where 
women are found to participate in legislative activities at levels nearly equal to men 
(Thomas and Welch 1991; Flammang 1985) and take the lead on legislation dealing with 
women, children, and family issues (Gelhlen 1977; Saint Germain 1989; Reingold 1990; 
Thomas 1991; Thomas and Welch 1991). Each analysis provides incredible insight into 
the role gender differences play in representation, with most scholars now in agreement 
that the inclusion of women, their presence (descriptive representation) in political 
decision-making is an essential condition for women’s substantive representation to be 
achieved (Phillips 1995, Young 2002) because of their ability to enhance the quality of 
deliberations. Their presence is believed to “improve the quality of communication and 
aid the articulation of previously uncrystallised interests” (Mansbridge 1999). 
  In the same way, this dissertation will approach the question of representation not 
by comparing women and men legislators but by comparing minority and non-minority 
legislators.  Importantly, I implicitly make the assumption that racial identity is of higher 
importance than other important social identities, like gender, class, and sexual 
orientation (see Young 2000).   Thus, the foundation set forth in the literature on women 
and representation provides a foundation and context for this dissertation, as well as a 
preliminary point for building a framework that can be used to better understand the 
legislative behavior of African Americans and Latinos.  
 
Race and Deliberation: An Assessment 
Studies on the role of race in legislative deliberation are found lacking in the 
literature.  Three studies are worth noting. While Canon’s (1999) congressional research 
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on African Americans in congress finds that they, like women, contribute to deliberation 
differently, Katrina Gamble’s (2007) study is the only systematic research on race and 
deliberation at the committee level.  Each study, however, has its limitations.  
Canon’s (1999) study examines African American deliberation with regard to floor 
speeches and finds some evidence that they indeed contribute to deliberation differently 
from their white counterparts. He finds that over 50.9% of the speeches given by African 
American representatives involve race in comparison to 11.8% of the speeches given by 
their white peers. However, I would argue that floor speeches are not the ideal measure 
for an investigation on deliberation and will discuss this further in another section.   
While Canons (1999) work on floor speeches is one of the few works that provides  
insight on race and the deliberation process, it can be argued that “focusing on floor 
debate is simplistic, contending instead that the most important deliberation occurs earlier 
in the process” (Quirk 1993).   Quirk (1993) contends that "floor debate is too late and 
too short for responsible deliberation”.  I would also argue that too much of the process is 
missed when focusing solely on floor debates, hence why this project will take a few 
steps back and examine participation because it is a necessary prerequisite for 
deliberation and the deliberation that occurs during committee hearings.   
 Gamble (2007) examines African Americans and the deliberative process at the 
congressional level and focuses on congressional committees, which provides significant 
opportunities for deliberation.  She finds that African American legislators were more 
likely to speak to the concerns of marginalized groups in comparison to their White 
counterparts; however her results were statistically insignificant.   
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More recently Minta (2011) examines the amount of time spent by minority 
legislators deliberating in congressional oversight committee hearings which focus on 
minority civil rights policies. While he finds evidence that Black and Latino legislators 
are more likely to intervene during the hearings, it is limited to oversight hearings on civil 
rights legislation at the congressional level.  
Each of these studies have influenced the direction of this dissertation in a 
considerable way, however, these findings suggest that there are substantial opportunities 
for exploration in the area. For example, Minta (2011) and Gamble (2007) are limited 
with regard to committee variation, with Minta (2011) examining one committee and 
Gamble (2007) examining three. Also, Gamble’s (2007) work had no explanation as to 
why African Americans were participating on non-minority interest legislation at higher 
rates. A solid in depth analysis will give insight into this underserved area in the 
literature. The question is whether additional focus on committees is worthwhile.  
  Bessette (1994) points out that committee hearings provide unmatched 
opportunities for "detailed and extensive policy deliberation," which include the 
opportunity for witness testimony and cross-examination, while also providing the 
opportunity to summarize and assess critically pertinent reports and other types of 
information (see also Muir 1982).   One primary reason little has been done with regard 
to this type of analysis is due to the time consuming nature of collecting this type of data 
and the ease of accessibility with regard to obtaining committee hearing transcripts, 
especially at the state level.    
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PARTICIPATION AND COMMITTEE DELIBERATION 
Our knowledge of how minority representatives affect the policy making process 
is a result of the limited research on committees.  In committees “a process of group 
discussion in committees helps to increase information levels, identify erroneous 
reasoning, cool passions, and otherwise make it less likely that lawmakers will make 
flawed assessments of the merits of a piece of legislation before taking action on it” 
(Bessette 1994).  Legislation is often shaped within committees and subcommittees well 
before coming to the floor for a final vote, and subsequently this is where most of the 
language of the bill is developed (Gamble 2007).  Committees have many responsibilities 
in the process as they collect information through hearings and are responsible for mass 
distribution of information through committee reports (Gamble 2007).  According to 
Bessette (1994) committees are seen as the main deliberative arenas.   
 In a seminal study on state legislative committees, Francis (1989) points out that 
while committees are not always seen as the only focal point in the state legislative 
process they are perceived as significant in most state legislatures. He finds that in eighty 
one of the ninety nine state legislative chambers committees were considered crucial in 
the decision making process relative to party and leadership (Francis 1989). More 
importantly, he finds that in twenty five of thirty six chambers, regular committee 
meetings were consistently selected as an important place for significant decision making 
activity. Moreover, Hamm and Hedlund (1994) state that “while there are some 
differences in terms of state, chamber, and session, overall, committees are more highly 
ranked than leadership, the governor’s office, the chamber floor, pre-legislative sessions, 
or party caucuses”. In general, legislative committees at the state level are essential for 
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decision making on the content of bills and are significant in the policy making process at 
the state level. 
The research to date on minorities with regard to participation and deliberation has 
examined Congress (Gamble 2007; Canon 1991).  “A major distinction between congress 
and state legislatures is that in Congress almost no bills become law” (Stewart 2001).  
Stewart (2001) finds that total enactments of legislation in most state legislatures are 
consistently greater than enactments in Congress.  For instance, the median number of 
enactments in state legislatures is over 70 percent higher than in Congress.  I argue that 
proposing legislation that has an increased opportunity to become law offers my research 
a different dynamic because of the increased potential for legislator impact, in 
comparison to Congress where legislators have little to show for his or her efforts.   
 
Proposed Research 
Despite the fact that there have been substantial increases in minority state 
legislators, little is known about what roles they play in their legislatures and what 
benefits they provide their constituents. Most of the literature has centered on the 
electoral process (Guinier 1991), mainly at the congressional level. Most state legislators 
have considerably more control over their representational role than a congressman 
because it has not yet reached the complex level of institutionalization as congress 
(Jewell 1982). State legislators are much closer to their constituents because reside 
among them most of the time which allows expanded opportunities for direct contact 
(Jewell 1982). Arguably, these state level dynamics allow this study to broaden our 
understanding of legislator behavior.  
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Additionally, state governments play a considerable role in the policy process with 
regard to areas specifically related to minority constituencies such as education, health 
care and criminal justice. This study will provide an examination of the deliberation 
process which will provide a firsthand account of how minority legislators substantively 
represent minority interests and how they compare with their non-minority colleagues. 
Pinpointing policy interests’ specific to racial minorities is a challenge and a debate in the 
minority politics literature. The debate ensues because determining policy interests for 
African Americans and Latinos is a complex issue. Scholars determine that these interests 
are determined via subjective and/or objective measures, with subjective evaluations 
being less reliable because they are based on feelings and emotions of minority groups. 
Yet, most social scientists look to subjective measures like public opinion polls and 
surveys to identify these policy interests (Haynie 2001). However, while the methods for 
determining the interests may differ either through survey results or objective measures 
like socioeconomic indicators, the outcomes tend to yield similar results and the minority 
policy areas remain fairly consistent in the scholarly literature.  
This dissertation will focus on policy areas that have historically been perceived as 
minority interests areas such as education, immigration, bilingual education, health, 
social welfare, civil rights and employment opportunity issues (Sanchez 2006, Haynie 
2001), but when examining deliberation I will determine specific minority interest bills 
using a systematic approach. It employs an original data generating process which allows 
for analysis of not just one racial minority - albeit quite common in the minority politics 
literature which primarily examines African Americans – but will include both African 
Americans and Latinos.  This dissertation, therefore, will align with many scholars of 
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minority politics who suggest that Latinos and African Americans share similar shared 
experiences in the United States, in that they both are economically disadvantaged to 
whites, both experience considerable discrimination in housing, education and 
employment, and both support enlarging the social welfare state (Kaufmann 2003). 
 
PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION 
In order to address the research questions previously mentioned and to expand the 
scope of the narrow body of work that examines deliberation (Canon 1999; Gamble 
2005; 2007), in chapter two I provide a brief description of the Texas legislature and its 
importance to this project. In chapter three, I perform an analysis of minority legislator 
attendance and participation
2
 rates on minority interest and non-minority interest bills. In 
chapter four, I perform a case study of the Texas school finance legislation during the 
2006 legislative session, which takes a closer look at the concepts of descriptive and 
substantive representation within the confines of participation and deliberation. In chapter 
five, I specifically outline the operationalization and coding techniques used to analyze 
the data. In chapter six, I perform content analysis of minority representatives’ language 
on minority interest bills for racial perspectives during state legislative committee 
hearings using the techniques outlined in the case study. Chapter seven concludes with 
major findings and themes, important policy implications, as well as laying the 
groundwork for future research. 
 
                                                 
2
 Participation is operationalized as member’s activity during formal committee hearings which includes, 
attendance, speaking, voting participation, offering amendments, role in authorship of bill or amendment.  
(closely modeled to Hall 1987) 
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CHAPTER 2:  
 CONTEXT FOR THE STUDY OF SUBSTANTIVE MINORITY REPRESENTATION: 
THE TEXAS LEGISLATURE 
 
In order to address the research questions previously mentioned and to expand the 
scope of the narrow body of work that examines deliberation (Canon 1999; Gamble 
2005; 2007), I will perform an analysis of minority legislator participation
3
 rates on bills. 
In addition, I will perform content analysis of minority representatives’ language on bills 
for racial perspectives during state legislative committee hearings.  While a considerable 
amount of literature on representation has been conducted at the congressional level, each 
of these methods will make an empirical and theoretical contribution to the literature on 
our understanding of minority representational behavior because it will provide an in 
depth, multiple contexts and multiple session analysis at the state level which has yet to 
be explored.  While a comparative study across states in this area is preferable, with the 
labor intensive data collection nature of this project I will focus on a one state analysis at 
this time. However, I will examine two racial minorities (African Americans and 
Latinos), multiple committees, and three legislative sessions in comparison to Gamble’s 
(2007) congressional research which examines one legislative session, one racial group 
and one committee. Below I will provide some insight into why I chose to include 
specific areas in the dissertation.  
In order to address the research questions proposed the state legislature that is 
examined must meet certain criteria. These criteria include a legislature with a large 
                                                 
3
 Participation is operationalized as member’s activity during formal committee hearings which includes, 
attendance, speaking, voting participation, offering amendments, role in authorship of bill or amendment.  
(closely modeled to Hall 1987) 
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African American and Latino population, a significant amount of minority 
representatives present in the legislature over time, and a state legislature with a relatively 
robust committee system.  After careful analysis, two possibilities arise, Texas and 
California.  However, California has some drawbacks in which I will explain.  First, in 
terms of legislative structure, California is similar to the U.S. Congress, and this project 
aims to examine state legislatures because of the distinct differences it has in relation to 
congress.  Second, California has term limits which have not always been in place, which 
is a major institutional impact that will undoubtedly affect the empirical analysis.  
Numerous scholars have found that term limits impact legislative behavior during the 
policy process.  For instance, Kousser (2005) finds that term limits reduce incentives for 
policy specialization and minimize policy innovation. Finally, California’s legislature is 
small with 40 senators and 80 legislators, leaving fewer opportunities for investigation.  
Therefore, the choice for this analysis is Texas. 
 
KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TEXAS SYSTEM 
Minority Population and Texas Demographics  
  As the 2010 Census shows the U.S. minority population increased dramatically. 
The Latino population grew by 43 percent, rising from 35.3 million to 50.5 million, and 
now comprises roughly 16 percent of the U.S. population (Census 2010).  The African 
American population grew from 34.7 million in 2000 to 38.9 million in 2010; however, 
they experienced very little growth in relation to their percentage of the total population, 
moving from 12 to 13 percent (Census 2010).  The White population  rose from 211.5 
million in 2000 to 223.6 million in 2010, however they were the only group to experience 
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a decrease in their relative percentage to the population, falling from 75 percent in 2000 
to 72 percent in 2010 (Census 2010).  
Texas’ population is diverse and in many ways a microcosm of the U.S. 
population at large. As of the 2010 Census, Texas ranked second in the nation in terms of 
total population. The key fact, however, is that Texas is now a majority minority state, 
where over 50% of the population is now minority. This dramatic increases in its 
minority population is  due to the exploding Hispanic population, which now comprises 
38 percent of the population in 2010 compared with only 18.6 percent  in 2000 (Census 
2010).  
While the state population overall has become majority minority, the composition 
of the state legislature has remained more stable.   In Texas from 1993-2009, African 
Americans have been represented by 13-14 state legislators, while the Latino legislator 
membership has seen more of a gradual increase from 23 in 1993 to 30 in 2007 and down 
to 29 in 2009 (see graph 2-1).  However, while Latino representatives are roughly double 
that of African Americans, they are still underrepresented relative to the Latino 
population. This is important because arguably Latino representatives would more likely 
advocate on behalf of Latino constituents impacting state public policy. 
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Graph 2-1: Texas Legislature Racial Make-Up 1993-2009 
 
 
Texas Politics 
Current Texas politics is definitely impacted by the Texas Constitution of 1876 
which was a document written to limit the powers of state government, particularly those 
of the governor by making many of the positions that make executive level decisions be 
elected by the populace (Tannahill 2009). Interestingly, many of the main components of 
the Texas Constitution of 1876 have remained the same, for instance, the legislature still 
meets biennially. While the compensation for legislators has definitely increased from its 
1876 rate of $3 a day, it currently remains at levels amended in the 1975 Constitution of 
$7,200 a year (Luttbeg and Tucker 2009). An argument could be made that this design 
was appropriate during the time the constitution was drafted because it adequately served 
its purpose which was to limit government and save money for an economically 
struggling state.  However, the demographics and demands of Texas have changed 
considerably and the components of the constitution have not adapted to these changes.  
Inadvertently, because deliberation time is short due to the biennial session but massive 
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policy demands increase due to the growing population, a system has developed in which 
legislative leaders, i.e. the speaker of the house and the lieutenant governor, have 
garnered a significant amount of power (Tucker 2008).   
 
Texas Legislature - Basic Structure 
The subsequent sections of this chapter are simply to provide background and 
contextual information on the Texas legislature. The legislative body is comprised of 150 
House Representatives and 31 Senate members, elected via single member districts. The 
Senate members are elected in staggered terms every four years.  Each senator must be at 
least a five year resident of Texas, a registered voter, and twenty six years of age or older.  
The House members are elected to two year terms with no term limits and must be a two 
year resident (a one year resident of the district he or she is representing), at least 21 
years old, and a registered voter.  Texas is one of seven states that meet biennially (every 
two years) for a 140 day session, at which time it elects a Speaker of the House who is 
deemed the legislature’s presiding officer and the Lieutenant Governor who acts as the 
Senate's presiding officer (Texas legislature online 2012). The governor, however, can 
call special sessions that can last up to 30 days, which is occurring more often due to the 
constraints of the biennial session and the rapidly growing demands of the Texas 
population (Texas legislature online 2012).   
 
Committees System Organization 
The area in which this dissertation focuses is the committee system. Notably, the 
committee system in Texas is very powerful and continues to remain a crucial component 
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of the Texas legislature landscape. The senate on average has fifteen standing 
committees, while the House has forty two - with subcommittees forming when 
necessary.  The committee chairs are appointed by the lieutenant governor and the 
speaker of the House.  The committee chairs have significant power in the Texas 
legislature because of their agenda setting power and ability to not allow bills to reach 
committee for a hearing.  
Prior to the overwhelming Republican gains in 2002, the Texas legislature was 
fairly bipartisan in nature with Democratic leaders appointing Republicans to chair key 
committees. However, since 2002, Republicans have been the majority party in the Texas 
house and the majority in the Senate since 1996 and this tradition has not continued to the 
same extent. But minority party members do chair key committees.  The Democrats do 
maintain considerable strength due to the grassroots strength of the party, the political 
caucus cohesion (i.e. Latino and African American caucus) for important legislation, and 
prior to the supermajority of Republicans in 2011 - the informal power sharing agreement 
with Republican House speaker Joe Straus (Jones 2011; Hamm and Moncrief 2012).  
Importantly, Texas committee assignments are not simply allocated based on the 
preferences of the party in power as in some states (Squire and Hamm 2005), but 
seniority is factored in as well. The Texas House rules require “a maximum of one-half of 
the membership on each standing committee, exclusive of the chair and vice-chair shall 
be determined by seniority” (Rules of the Texas House 2012, 39). This rule applies to 
standing substantive committees
4
 and seniority is defined as cumulative years of service 
                                                 
4
 “Seniority shall not apply to a procedural committee. For purposes of these rules, the procedural 
committees are the Committee on Calendars, the Committee on Local and Consent Calendars, the 
Committee on Rules and Resolutions, the General Investigating and Ethics Committee, the Committee 
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in the House of Representatives. Therefore, the committees in Texas, especially power 
committees, have some balance with regard to party affiliation and race because of the 
seniority rule, which provides a diverse environment for deliberation. 
 
Committee System Importance  
Four institutional and contextual features make Texas a good choice for examining 
legislator’s verbal interactions in committee hearings.  First, the Texas legislature is more 
professionalized than most states (ranking 20 out of 50), which makes attaining 
legislative seats worthwhile (Squire 1992). Second, it has a significant amount of 
minority representatives, ranking 16
th
 among the 50 states for number of African 
American legislators and 2
nd
 for number of Latino legislators (National Conference of 
State Legislatures 2012). Third, the regular committee meetings in the Texas House of 
Representatives are considered of uniformly high importance for key decision making 
activity (Francis 1989).  Fourth, committee power and effectiveness is considered high 
based on the index created by Rosenthal (1974) which identified and analyzed four 
dimensions of committee system effectiveness in all 50 states which included 1) the 
extent to which committees receive legislation, 2) the extent to which committees control 
the screening of legislation, 3) the extent to which committees shape the nature of 
legislation, and 4) the extent to which committees affect the passage of legislation. In 
addition, committee size also plays a role, where eleven is the optimal size of committee 
membership in large chambers and seven in small chambers in order to prevent difficult 
deliberation and decision making (Francis 1989). Texas is found to be ranked high among 
                                                                                                                                                 
on House Administration, and the Committee on Redistricting. The entire membership of these 
committees shall be appointed by the speaker” (Texas House Rules 2012, 39) 
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the states with regard to committee power based on these four dimensions and on average 
has eleven members per committee with the exception of Appropriations which has 
considerably more responsibilities than other committees.    
 
The Role of Texas Committees in the Legislative Process 
The committee system in Texas is found to have significant decision making 
power because it is a critical stage in the legislative process. Namely, the Texas 
Constitution mandates that all legislation must pass through both Houses of the 
legislature before it can be enacted into law, a premise in the literature on committees 
which defines levels of committee power (Francis, 1970; Keefe and Ogul 1977; Hamm 
1980). It is in committee where legislation is closely examined before it proceeds to the 
next step in the legislative process. For example, in the 2009 legislative session, 4976 
House bill and joint resolutions were introduced and only 2,199 or 44% were reported 
favorably from House committees
5
 (HRO 2011). In the Texas legislature, a significant 
amount of bills die before ever making it out of committee which makes it a considerable 
decision making point during the process. For the sake of providing institutional context 
in the following paragraph I will briefly describe how the committee system in Texas 
works.  
Once more, the Texas committee system is one that holds considerable power 
because it is a prime gate keeping mechanism in that all legislation must pass through 
committee before consideration at other legislative levels, and committees are not 
required to consider every piece of legislation referred to them. Therefore if the 
                                                 
5
 Based on information from the Texas House Research Organization (HRO) in the  House Committee 
Procedures: 82nd Legislature Focus Report, February 2011 
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committee decides not to act on legislation, it will not pass through to the next stage of 
the legislative process. Committees may leave legislation pending or refer it to a 
subcommittee but work on any piece of legislation is not considered final until it is 
reported favorably or unfavorably by the committee. The flow diagram below shows the 
process of legislation once the speaker has referred it to a particular committee.  
 
Diagram 1: Process of Legislation 
 
 
 
Simply, it goes to the chair, then the committee staff where an analysis of the bill is 
distributed to all committee members and an action is decided. If the committee decides 
to hear the legislation then a committee hearing is scheduled where action may be taken 
on the bill. If a quorum is present, then final action is recorded (i.e. reported favorably or 
unfavorably). 
 
SUMMARY 
Overall, an analysis of Texas provides a comprehensive contribution on the topic 
of deliberation and participation because it is one of a few states with sizable African 
American as well as Latino legislators, and it is ranked high among the states with regard 
to decision making power within committees (Francis 1989).  I examine the house rather 
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than the senate because state houses tend to provide more opportunities for minority 
representation due to the sheer size and the electoral system of single member districts in 
comparison to state senate’s which tend to have fewer seats and require larger 
percentages of minority populations to elect minority legislators (Groffman and Handley 
1989).   I contend that these dynamics will provide some insight and context into when 
and under what circumstances minority legislators are most likely to offer a distinctive 
voice and perspective. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
 
SHOWING UP AND SHOWING OUT? AN INVESTIGATION OF MINORITY 
LEGISLATORS PARTICIPATION ON MAJOR LEGISLATION IN THE TEXAS 
HOUSE 
 
 
In order to examine minority legislator behavior during the deliberative phase, in 
this chapter I will first examine their participation on key legislation at the committee 
level to determine if in fact they are even a part of the process for deliberation to occur. 
An empirical analysis of deliberative efforts of minority representatives at the state 
committee level is necessary and long overdue; below I will briefly detail the significance 
of studying deliberation at the committee level. 
COMMITTEES 
In order to examine the impact of race on substantive representation, I will examine 
committees. Legislative scholars have recognized committees as critical to representation 
and find that substantive representation may be more visible at the committee level, 
mainly because this is where deliberation usually occurs and where legislators typically 
talk and share information before reaching decisions by voting (Mathis 2011).  While 
some scholars argue that key decisions occur not in state committees but on the 
legislative floor (Van der Slik 1977; Canon 1999), many important legislative decisions 
are made at the committee level. Indeed, committee hearings are seen as the main 
deliberative arenas and provide unparalleled opportunities for "detailed and extensive 
policy deliberation," (Bessette 1994).  Usually, committees shape and develop the 
language of legislation well before coming to the floor for a final vote (Gamble 2007). In 
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particular, state legislative committees are essential for decision making on the content of 
bills and are significant in the policy making process at the state level because of their 
control of substantive content, agenda setting and gate keeping role in the legislature 
(Haynie 2001). “While there are some differences in terms of state, chamber, and session, 
overall, committees are more highly ranked than leadership, the governor’s office, the 
chamber floor, pre-legislative sessions, or party caucuses” (Hamm and Hedlund 1994). 
With the increasing numbers of minority legislators and the significant increases in the 
minority population, examining the behavior of minority legislators at the committee 
level is crucial in our understanding of deliberation and substantive representation. And 
while the importance of committee activity is duly noted in the literature (Fenno 1973; 
Hamm 1980; Hall 1996), investigation at the state level remains understudied, with most 
of the work concentrated at the congressional level.   
In addition to expanding the research beyond African Americans to include Latinos, 
examining state legislative committees provides unparalleled research opportunities given 
the sheer numbers of both African American and Latino legislators as the potential policy 
impact of these minorities. For instance, “a major distinction between congress and state 
legislatures is that in Congress almost no bills become law” (Stewart 2001), whereas total 
enactments of legislation in most state legislatures are consistently greater than in 
Congress (Stewart 2001).  Significantly, Stewart (2001) finds that the median number of 
enactments in state legislatures is over 70 percent higher than in Congress.  I argue that 
examining an institution where the legislation proposed has an increased opportunity to 
become law offers a different dynamic to the consequence of race as well as other 
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pertinent factors because of the increased potential for legislator impact, in comparison to 
Congress where legislators have little to show for his or her efforts.   
PARTICIPATION 
 
Hall (1996) argues that “the assembly makes possible a deliberation in which 
conflicting judgments about the public good, or even the efficient promotion of narrow 
interests, can be examined, debated, and resolved. And through such a process the actions 
of government achieve legitimacy.” However, representatives make difficult choices on 
how much of their time, effort, and resources they can commit to a policy issue (Hall 
1987). Therefore, examining participation not only aids to our understanding of legislator 
preferences, they also further our understanding of legislator preference intensity.  Due to 
the fact that legislators have countless demands on their time and resources - from 
constituent services, committee work, and other work commitments – their dedication in 
attending committee hearings, providing amendments, and voting on legislation 
exemplifies an intensity of preferences regarding certain legislation (Hall 1996). For 
example, Hall (1996) points out, “the quality of representation can be understood through 
choice intensity as it is defined by how strongly legislators deliberate and advocate for 
certain policy interests, comparatively or better than their voting record can”. This 
distinction is particularly relevant because preferences and preference intensity provides a 
more complete view of the contribution of minority legislators, thereby a better 
understanding of their substantive role in the legislative process.  Thus, while structural 
and personal characteristics of a legislator (e.g., party affiliation, leadership position, 
terms in office, policy goals, constituency concerns, desire to make good policy, expertise 
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or interest in a particular bill, and gender) have been considered important determinants 
of participation in committee hearings (Hall 1987, Kathlene 1994), the effect of a 
committee member's race has been largely overlooked. 
 If normative theorists are correct in asserting that that descriptive representation 
results in legislators voicing the concerns of marginalized groups in the public 
policymaking process as it relates to minority interest issues (Mansbridge 1999; Williams 
1998; Young 2000), we should be able to confirm this assertion  by studying the level  of 
participation by minority representatives Specifically, participation determines if 
minorities have more of a preference than white legislators on certain legislation, and 
tells us how much they engage in committee deliberations.  It is a scale of member’s 
activity during formal committee hearings which includes attendance, speaking, offering 
amendments, and agenda setting. Thus it is important to examine representative 
participation in committee hearings as they may indeed affect the legislative agenda in 
ways that directly affect outcomes.  Taking this into consideration, the following 
hypotheses are generated from an adaptation
6
 of Hall’s (1996) participation variable:  
 
H1: Minorities will participate more on minority interest bills than on non-minority 
interest bills, holding all things constant. 
 
H2: Minority representatives will participate at higher rates on minority interest bills 
than will non-minority representatives, holding all things constant.   
 
H3: Minority representatives will participate more on non-minority interest bills than 
their non-minority representatives, holding all things constant. 
 
The logic supporting these hypotheses follows. I argue that participation of African 
American and Latino legislators on minority interest bills is a result of linked fate and 
                                                 
6
 Hall’s (1987) participation variable includes voting and distinguishes between minor and major speaking 
participant, this paper does not. 
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racial group consciousness. Scholars have found that both African American and Latinos 
possess racial group consciousness and ideas of linked which center on the belief that 
what affects the group also affects the individual regardless of socioeconomic status 
(Garcia Bedolla 2009; Minta 2011; Grose 2011). Indeed, if minorities enter into the 
legislative arena acting in the same way as their nonminority counterparts, then they are 
merely descriptive representatives. However, if in fact they provide a distinctive voice for 
the minority populations, substantive representation is occurring, moreover surrogate 
representation. Surrogate representation is a concept that has been used in the literature 
on women and politics, African American politics, American legislative politics, and 
normative theory (Mansbridge 2011; Gamble 2007; Urbinati and Warren 2008). 
Surrogate representation “expands the normative and empirical study of representation 
beyond the relationship of constituents with their elected representatives to the entire 
representative system” (Mansbridge 2011). For instance, Haynie (2001) suggests that 
while the priorities of political actions of state legislators should first be governed by a 
desire to represent their district, African American legislators tend to take on the 
additional obligation to pursue racial group representation.  
Similarly, I would argue Latino legislators also take on this additional obligation. 
Fraga et al. (2003) suggests that Latino representatives also feel a sense of obligation to 
the broader Latino community that extends beyond their districts due to similar shared 
experiences. These actions are a result of the idea that because of the shared culture and 
often similar experiences among the group (i.e. exclusion from the political process and 
discrimination), there is a sense of obligation to the broader African American and Latino 
community because of the “recognition that individual life chances are inextricably tied 
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to the race as a whole” (Simien 2005), also known as the concept of linked fate (Dawson 
1994; Mansbridge 1999; Tate 2003). 
In addition, my expectation that minority representatives will participate more on 
non-minority interest bills than their non-minority counterparts is based on the idea that 
minority representatives tend to look at all bills in a way that may impact minority 
constituents. Similar, to the theoretical positions in the women and politics literature 
which suggests that women would cast a critical eye toward all legislation, making 
judgments on how its purposes would indirectly affect segments of overlooked 
constituencies (Thomas 1994). Gamble (2007) also finds in her analysis of participation 
in Congress that African Americans participated more on non-minority interest 
legislation in comparison to minority interest legislation. In subsequent chapters I account 
for whether or not there is more minority interest language used by minority legislators in 
comparison to non-minority legislators on non-minority interest bills. This chapter is the 
prerequisite for that analysis in that I will first determine whether or not there is a 
significant difference regarding race and participation on non-minority interest bills.  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 Ideally, a study of minority participation will take place across states, however, 
due to the laborious nature of the data gathering process for this project rather than 
choosing a state that has typical state characteristics, it was important to choose a state 
with a significant minority population and minority representatives.  The Texas 
legislature, while not typical, provides a great opportunity for analysis because of the 
recent history of competitive party politics and significant minority population. It is also 
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reflective of a shifting U.S. population, in that Texas is now a majority minority state, 
where the minority population is now greater than the non-minority population. 
  As mentioned in chapter two, an analysis of Texas provides a comprehensive 
contribution on this topic because it is one of a few states with sizable African American 
as well as Latino legislators, and it is ranked high among the states with regard to 
decision making power within committees (Francis 1989).  I examine the house rather 
than the senate because state houses tend to provide more opportunities for minority 
representation due to the sheer size and the electoral system of single member districts in 
comparison to state senate’s which tend to have fewer seats and require larger 
percentages of minority populations to elect minority legislators  (Groffman and Handley 
1989).   I contend that these dynamics will provide some insight and context into when 
and under what circumstances minority legislators are most likely to offer a distinctive 
voice and perspective.  
 
Legislative Sessions Selected 
I examine minority policy interests in the Texas State House of Representatives 
for the 78
th 
(2003), 80
th
 (2007) and 81
st
 (2009) legislative sessions. These sessions were 
chosen because they offered significant percentages of Latino and African American 
legislators which allowed for variance in the number of minority legislators on key 
committees, many of which serve jurisdictions that may impact significant levels of 
African American and Latino populations. I examine participation activity of individual 
legislators across multiple committees. 
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Bills Sampled 
 I sampled bills that had passed through committee
7
 and all were identified as major 
legislation during each of the legislative sessions based on information from the Texas 
House Research Organization (HRO)
8
. Some of these bills had been approved and some 
had not. Information based on these bills during these legislative sessions provides rich 
opportunities to examine the impact of race on representation. 
Each bill was content coded for minority interest or non-minority interest. The 
minority interest bills were further subdivided into African American, Latino, and/or 
general minority interest. The bills designated as African American and/or Latino interest 
explicitly mentioned African Americans and/or Latinos in the title, description, or in the 
House Research Organization detailed analysis on the legislation
9
. General minority 
interest bills were bills with issues that disproportionally affect minority groups, but may 
not explicitly mention a particular group.  
I analyze a total of 167 bills; 40 minority interest bills and 127 non-minority 
interest bills. There are a total of 104 enrolled (i.e. passed) bills and 62 non-enrolled bills 
(see table 3-1). For details regarding bills analyzed in the dataset see Appendix A, which 
includes each individual bill description, committee, and enrollment status.  
                                                 
7
 Bills that died in committee, never received a hearing, or no action was taken on a proposed motion or 
amendment were excluded from the dataset. 
8
 Based on information from the Texas House Research Organization (HRO) – The House Research 
Organization (HRO) is a nonpartisan independent department of the Texas House of Representatives. It 
provides impartial information on legislation and issues before the Texas Legislature. This is similar to 
Walsh’s (2002) design which examines deliberative contributions among women on major legislation 
related and non-related to women issues. 
9
 Each bill analysis consists of a digest of the bill's provisions, background, arguments for and against the 
bill, and additional pertinent information. 
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Table 3-1: Descriptive Statistics on Bill Observations 
 
Legislative 
Session 
Total Bills Minority 
Interest Bills 
Non-Minority 
Interest Bills 
Enrolled Non-
Enrolled 
78
th
 46 10 36 31 15 
 
80th 49 14 35 31 17 
 
81st 72 16 56 42 30 
 
Total 167 40 127 104 62 
  
Dependent Variable 
 
The unit of analysis in the model is the individual legislator and the dependant 
variable is the participation score of each committee member on the bill being 
considered. Participation is coded based on Hall’s (1987) operationalization of 
participation which is a scale of member’s activity during formal committee hearings 
which includes, attendance, speaking, offering amendment(s), and agenda setting
10
. It is a 
4 point scale ranging from 0 to 4, where 0 is non participation, 1 is attending the 
committee hearing, 2 is speaking during the hearing, 3 is offering an amendment, and 4 is 
significant agenda setting. Legislators participation score is equivalent to each of the 
categories added together, with the highest possible score of 10 (see Table 3-2). The data 
for the participation variable was collected from the recorded and published committee 
                                                 
10
 Agenda setting is equivalent to offering a committee substitute that passed. I will not code 
informal participation as Hall (1987) does as part of his coding category, because as Gamble (2007) finds 
that this category is unreliable based on the fact the interviewees and staff must recall information that 
happened years prior, lending to unreliable measures. 
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hearing minutes. These reports include information showing the time and place of the 
meeting, the date of the posting of the meeting, a roll call of the members present, 
recorded votes, actions taken, and lists of witnesses. 
Table 3-2: Committee Participation Scale 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Hall (1987, 1996) and Gamble (2005, 2007) 
 
Key Independent Variables 
My key independent variables include minority which is a dummy variable for the 
race of the representative (Bratton and Haynie 1999) where 0 is White and 1 is African 
American and Latino legislators. Minority interest bill is a dummy variable where 0 is 
non-minority interest and 1 is minority interest bill, however, in many parts of the 
analysis separate models exist for minority interest and non-minority interest bills. 
Control Variables 
 
I control for a number of variables that have been demonstrated to affect 
substantive representation beyond those listed in the hypotheses (See Table 3-3). These 
include: Democrat coded as a dummy variable where 0 is republican and 1 is democrat; 
female coded 0 and 1, male and female respectively; bill author, coded as a dummy 
variable 0 (not the bill author) and 1 (bill author). Since scholars have found that senior 
members are more likely to participate actively in committee deliberations (Cook 1986; 
Score 
 
Committee Activity 
0 No involvement 
 
1 Attended Committee Hearing 
 
2 Spoke during committee hearing 
 
3 Offered Amendment  
 
4 Engaged in Agenda Action 
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Squire 1988; Hibbing 1991, 1993), I include seniority which is coded as a dummy 
variable where 0 represents a legislator in their first term and 1 represents legislators who 
have served terms in office greater than 1. Because the literature finds that when minority 
representatives hold positions of power over specific policy areas minority group 
influence over that specific policy increases (Preuhs 2006),  I have included a political 
incorporation variable, coded as 0 (member), 1 (vice chair) and  2 (chair). District 
characteristics as it plays an important role in legislative behavior (e.g. black/Latino 
district population percent, family income, urban/rural percent, foreign born percent) 
(Rouse 2008) (see table 1-3). Specifically, Latino and African American populations 
within a district have shown legislators more responsive to their interests (Canon 1999; 
Haynie 2001; Fraga et al 2003).    
 
Table 3-3: Operationalization of Key Descriptive Concepts 
 
Concept Indicator Hypothesized Relationship on 
Minority Interest Bills 
Minorities # of African American and Latino 
State Legislators 
 
+ 
Party Democrat 
 
+ 
Gender Female 
 
+ 
Bill Author Bill author 
 
+ 
Seniority Terms in office 
 
+ 
Political Incorporation Committee Vice Chair or Chair 
 
+ 
District Characteristics % Urban 
 
+ 
% African American and Latino 
 
+ 
Foreign Born % 
 
+ 
Income Below $10,000 + 
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RESULTS 
 
In order to interpret the effect of race on participation I use an ordered logit 
model. I use an ordered logit because my dependent variable participation is considered 
to have more than two categories and the values of each category have a meaningful 
sequential order where a value is indeed ‘higher’ than the previous one.  However, before 
analyzing the results of the ordered logit, I would simply like to examine the mean 
differences between the minorities and non-minorities on different bill types.   
Using a difference of means test, the results (see Table 3-4 and Graph 3-1 below) 
show a statistically significant relationship between minorities and non-minorities on 
participation of minority interest and non-minority interest bills. Specifically, non 
minorities have higher participation means on all bills in general; 1.83 mean participation 
score on minority interest bills in comparison to 1.51 for minority legislators. Non 
minorities have higher participation means on non-minority interest bills at 1.71, in 
comparison to minorities at 1.44. These findings do not support my hypotheses 
(Hypothesis 2 and 3) that Minorities will participate more on minority interest and non-
minority interest bills in comparison to their non-minority counterparts, they are in fact 
opposite. The difference of means test does however support Hypothesis 1 which states 
that Minorities will participate more on minority interest bills than on non-minority 
interest bills, with participation means of 1.51 to 1.44 respectively – however not 
statistically significant from each other. While further analysis is needed to uncover the 
reason for the low participation means of minorities, they do participate more on minority 
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interest bills in comparison to non-minority interest bills which is in line with my original 
hypothesis.  
 
Table 3-4: Participation Mean Comparisons by Bill Type and Race 
 
 Participation on 
All Bills 
Participation on 
Non-Minority 
Interest Bills 
Participation on 
Minority Interest 
Bills 
 
Minorities  1.46***  (.068) 1.44***   (.081) 1.51 *(.131) 
 
Non-Minorities 1.74 *** (.051) 1.71 ***  (.058) 1.83* (.109) 
 
# of observations 1721 1311 410 
 
          Significant at P<.01***, P -value <.05**, P-value <.10* (Standard errors in Parenthesis)       
          Minorities = African Americans and Latinos (No significant difference between the two groups). 
 
 
Graph 3-1: Participation Mean Comparisons by Bill Type and Race 
 
 
  
40 
 
The results of the ordered logit
11
 (see below in Table 3-5), provides estimates for 
the dependent variable, participation, on minority interest bills and non-minority interest 
bills. The analysis is based on 1596 observations. Consequently, the ordered log odds 
estimate shown is for a one unit increase in the independent variables’ score on the 
expected participation level given the other variables are held constant in the model. 
Therefore, the odds of minority legislators participating at higher levels in comparison to 
non-minority legislators on minority interest bills increases by .361, while the other 
variables in the model are held constant. In contrast, the odds of minority legislators 
participating at higher levels in comparison to non-minority legislators on non-minority 
interest bills decreases by .345, while the other variables in the model are held constant.  
However, neither result is statistically significant.  The explanatory variables that are 
statistically significant for both minority interest bills and non-minority interest bills 
include bill authorship, income and seniority. Both bill authorship and seniority show a 
positive relationship with higher committee participation levels, in line with the expected 
direction. While the district characteristic income, is negatively associated with 
participation on minority interest bill, contrary to the expected direction. 
The analysis indicates that legislators who author the bill and are more tenured 
participate more on minority interest bills. While minorities participate more on minority 
interest policies than their white colleagues, the results are not statistically significant. I 
also find, consistent with previous research, that incorporation (committee leadership) has 
a major impact on participation rates of representatives. 
 
                                                 
11
 I conducted multiple models (negative binomial regression, zero inflated, and a poisson model) that 
produced the same results regarding significance and coefficient direction as the ordered logit. 
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Table 3-5 
Ordered Logit Analysis of Committee Participation in the Texas House 
(78
th
, 80
th
 and 81
st
 Legislative Sessions) 
 
Significant at P<.01***, P -value <.05**, P-value <.10* 
Robust Standard Errors Reported in ( ) 
 
 
 
 
Independent Variables 
Non-Minority Interest 
Bills 
Minority Interest Bills 
Minorities -0.345 
(.277) 
0.361 
(.479) 
 
Incorporation 0.455*** 
(.091) 
0.669*** 
(.151) 
 
Female 
-0.181 
(.179) 
-.011 
(.308) 
Democrat -0.131 
(.232) 
.075 
(.413) 
 
Bill Author 
.996*** 
(.162) 
 
1.242*** 
(.296) 
 
Minority Population 0.002 
(.003) 
-0.0004 
(.010) 
Seniority  
.040** 
(.017) 
.073* 
(.042) 
 
Income below $10,000 
 
 
.004 
(.018) 
-.073* 
(.043) 
Urban 
.001 
(.004) 
-.001 
(.010) 
N 
 
 
1211 385 
R^2 
 
Chi
2***
  
 
.047 
.0000 
 
 
.085 
.0000 
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The overall low rates of participation beg the question; do minority legislators 
view committee work less meaningful than other legislative duties in comparison to their 
non-minority counterparts? Are they shirkers? Are institutional factors inhibiting their 
ability to participate?  Does the committee type play a role in participation? 
In an effort to uncover whether institutional factors may play a role, I analyze the 
differences between incorporated minorities and non incorporated minorities, in addition 
to comparing them to their incorporated non-minority counterparts. In line with previous 
research on minority leadership akin to Preuhs (2006) who investigates lower chambers 
and finds that when minority representatives hold positions of power over specific policy 
areas, minority group influence over that specific policy increases. I anticipate that 
holding leadership positions may impact participation. 
In support of the idea that institutional factors play a role in participation, I find a 
statistically significant relationship between the participation means of incorporated 
(those who hold leadership positions as committee vice-chair or committee chair) 
minorities and non incorporated minorities on both non-minority interest and minority 
interest bills, 2.3 and 1.79 to 1.44 and 1.51 respectively. Incorporated minorities also 
have higher statistically significant means in comparison to non minorities who are not 
incorporated on non-minority interest bills only, 2.3 to 1.71 respectively. However, 
incorporated non minorities have higher participation means on minority interest bills at 
2.52 in comparison to incorporated minorities at 1.79 (see Table 3-6).  
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Table 3-6: Participation Mean Comparisons by Bill Type and Incorporation 
 
 
 Participation on All 
Bills 
Participation on 
Non-Minority 
Interest Bills 
Participation on 
Minority Interest 
Bills 
Incorporated 
Minorities 
2.17 (.244) 2.3 (.303) 1.79* (.355) 
Incorporated Non-
Minorities 
2.37 (.121) 2.32 (.343) 2.525* (.226) 
# of observations 426 323 103 
Significant at P<.01***, P -value <.05**, P-value <.10* 
Please Note: Not statistically significant from each other (incorporated minorities vs. incorporated non-
minorities) but they are statistically significant from the entire sample. 
 
  
 
 
Graph 3-2: Participation Mean Comparisons by Bill Type and Incorporation 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Does descriptive representation lead to substantive representation? This is the big 
question examined in this paper and it considers the role that race of public officials play 
in influencing their behavior during the policy making process and to what extent race 
motivates their efforts in working on issues that come before the legislature. Previous 
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scholars find that minority interests are served just as well by non-minority 
representatives and at times better represented (Swain 1993; Thernstrom 1987). The 
evidence during committee hearings in the Texas House during the 78
th
, 80
th
, and 81
st
 
legislative sessions is contrary to these findings. While white representatives attended 
committee hearings (minority interest and non-minority interest) more often than 
minority representatives, there were sizeable differences in the participation levels on 
minority interests. While, the findings regarding the impact of  race on deliberative 
participation was not irrefutable, based on the data collected, the findings regarding 
incorporated minorities was positive and significant, suggesting that institutional 
mechanisms like increased staff and greater resources for committee leadership have 
positive impacts on the ability for minority representatives to advocate on behalf of 
minority populations.  
Additionally, this paper is my attempt to expand the definition of substantive 
representation to include deliberative aspects of the policy making process to better 
understand the role of race and substantive representation. Political theorists continually 
suggest the impact that inclusive deliberation and diversity has on representative 
democracy (Mansbridge 1999; Williams 1998) and institutions that do not include certain 
groups are unlikely to be viewed as equitable by those historically excluded (Minta 
2011), yet the increase of elected officials across all electoral institutions particularly 
state legislatures has been unexplored when examining deliberative aspects of the 
legislative process.  Therefore, this paper while not irrefutable regarding the role of race 
and the deliberative process provides worthwhile findings for future research in the area 
of substantive representation and how it is measured. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
MINORITY VOICES: A CASE STUDY OF AFRICAN AMERICAN AND 
LATINO BEHAVIOR DURING EDUCATION FINANCE LEGISLATION IN 
THE TEXAS LEGISLATURE 
 
In order to understand the differences among minority representatives and non-
minority representatives during the public policy making process, I first want to provide 
an in-depth analysis into how legislators deliberate on behalf of minority constituents 
using a case study approach.   The goal is to tap into the questions of whether descriptive 
representation results in substantive representation and what representational role African 
American and Latino state legislators play during the state legislative policy making 
process during a stage in the policymaking process where empirical analysis is 
underdeveloped. More specifically, I will examine the role that race plays in legislator 
behavior during the 2006 Texas legislative committee hearings surrounding education 
finance (i.e. House Bill 1).   
 
Indeed, the practical and theoretical impact of answering these questions may be 
significant. For example, if African American and Latino legislators voice their concerns 
on legislation during committee hearings on behalf of minority populations that advance 
minority interests in some way whether through amendments, funding allocations or 
language changes, this success could be an indication of the substantive impact of 
minority legislators on legislative outcomes beyond roll call votes and bill sponsorship. 
The current definition of substantive representation, therefore, would be expanded. Thus, 
if African American and Latino legislators are able to advance minority interests during 
committee hearings, it is possible that without their participation during the committee 
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hearing deliberative process both minority and non-minority interest legislation would be 
far less representative of minority interests.  
 
THE CASE  
The intent of this case study is to study the process of deliberation among 
minority and non-minority representatives at the state committee level. Hence, I will 
examine Texas state representative’s behavior during committee hearings when House 
Bill 1 was crafted, specifically, minority representatives in comparison to non-minority 
representatives.  Reiterating the aims of the dissertation, this case study will examine 
deliberation and how it relates to substantive representation - the theoretical underpinning 
for this project – which suggests that descriptive representatives who share unique 
experiences and backgrounds with minority constituents act as stronger advocates for 
minority group interests in comparison with non-minority legislators (Hero and Tolbert 
1995; Mansbridge 1999; Pitkin 1967; Bratton and Haynie 1999; Grose 2005; Whitby 
1997; Lublin 1999; Karnig and Welch 1980; Meier, Stewart and England 1989; Meier 
and Stewart 1991).   Because studies on race and deliberation are found lacking in the 
literature, and little is known about what roles minority legislators play in their 
legislatures and what benefits they provide their constituents during the policy making 
process, this case study will provide fertile ground for this investigation.  I argue that 
examining the deliberative and participatory aspects of how this legislation was formed 
within committee will provide a greater knowledge of the relationship between race and 
representation. Importantly, this case study will also help determine whether the coding 
method is practical and reliable in answering the theoretical question for this dissertation. 
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The focus on committee deliberation is an important one because according to 
prominent political theorists, committees are seen as the main deliberative arenas 
(Bessette 1994; Young 2000). Committee hearings provide unmatched opportunities for 
"detailed and extensive policy deliberation," which include the opportunity for witness 
testimony and cross-examination, while also providing the opportunity to summarize and 
assess critically pertinent reports and other types of information (Bessette 1994; Muir 
1982).  In committees “a process of group discussion in committees helps to increase 
information levels, identify erroneous reasoning, cool passions, and otherwise make it 
less likely that lawmakers will make flawed assessments of the merits of a piece of 
legislation before taking action on it” (Bessette 1994).  Legislation is often shaped within 
committees and subcommittees well before coming to the floor for a final vote, and 
subsequently this is where most of the language of the bill is developed (Gamble 2007).  
Committees have many responsibilities in the process as they collect information through 
hearings and are responsible for mass distribution of information through committee 
reports (Gamble 2007).   
 In general, legislative committees at the state level are essential for decision 
making on the content of bills and are significant in the policy making process at the state 
level. “While there are some differences in terms of state, chamber, and session, overall, 
committees are more highly ranked than leadership, the governor’s office, the chamber 
floor, pre-legislative sessions, or party caucuses” (Hamm and Hedlund 1994). 
Specifically, the regular committee meetings in the Texas House of Representatives are 
considered of uniformly high importance for key decision making activity (Francis 1989). 
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 In terms of the specific case, it is noteworthy to point out that in Texas the 
average and low wealth school districts are disproportionately concentrated with minority 
students; while the state’s wealthiest school districts are predominantly white (Cortez 
2009). Subsequently, educational equity remains a continued issue in Texas education 
policy.  I contend that these dynamics will provide some insight and context into when 
and under what circumstances minority legislators are most likely to offer a distinctive 
voice and perspective. More importantly, this case allows for an examination of whether 
minority legislators substantively represent minority interests and how they compare with 
their non-minority colleagues. In the following sections, I intend to provide an overview 
of Texas school finance litigation, the 2006 West Orange Cove versus Neeley Supreme 
court case, and the resulting legislation from which I will examine the role of minority 
legislators during the policy making process, specifically committee deliberation and the 
role it plays in regard to substantive representation of minority representatives.   
 
TEXAS EDUCATION POLICY: STRUCTURE 
Education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments 
with a significant amount of a state’s budget allocated for education expenditures (Texas 
Legislature Online 2012).  The Texas school system is a combined effort of state and 
local government, as well as school districts.  The general guidance and monitoring of 
education policy in the state is developed by the fifteen elected members of The State 
Board of Education and Texas Education Agency. The board has a governor elected chair 
and along with the members, hire the Commissioner of Education which heads The Texas 
Education Agency (TEA) (Riposa 1987).  While TEA and the State Board make broad 
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policy decisions, local school districts have a significant amount of autonomy.  The local 
districts have their own taxing authority within state guidelines and are governed by 
elected school board members.  The local taxing authority usually is the root of many of 
the issues that Texas continues to face regarding education policy in the state because it 
produces substantial financial inequities among districts. 
 
TEXAS SCHOOL FINANCE: BACKGROUND  
Local property taxes comprise a significant portion of funding for public education in 
Texas. The districts revenue in 2006 was over 42 billion dollars, where 52.4 percent was 
from local taxpayers, 37.8 percent from the state, and 9.8 percent from the federal 
government. [see Table 4-1 below]  
 
Table 4-1: State, Local, and Federal Education Contribution 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       (Texas Education Agency Data 2008) 
 
The reliance on property taxes tends to lead to disparities of education funding 
across different districts because property wealthy communities generate more revenue 
for education.  As a result, property wealthy communities have a larger tax base from 
which to generate real estate revenue, while property poor communities cannot generate 
the same amount of revenue for education, even when they tax at a higher rate.  
Consequently, poor children receive a lower quality of education than wealthier children. 
The Texas public school system is massive, coming a close second nationally to 
California with regard to public school enrollment.  Texas demographics provide an 
 2006-2007 
State Contribution 
37.8% 
Local Contribution 
52.4% 
Federal Contribution 9.8% 
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important context for the resulting litigation on equity because the disputes typically 
involve increasing or redistributing school funding which primarily benefits minority and 
economically disadvantaged students.  Texas has more than twelve hundred districts and 
charter schools and over eight thousand campuses (TEA 2008).  Currently, Texas has 
over 4.6 million students where half of these students are economically disadvantaged 
and 17 percent are limited English proficient.  The minority student population continues 
to see remarkable growth and makes up over 60 percent of the school system 
demographics, where 14 percent of the students are African American, 47 percent are 
Hispanic, and 34 percent are White (see Figure 1).  Notably, the minority annual dropout 
rate (African Americans and Latinos) is three to four times higher than non-minority 
(white) students in Texas since the 2003-2004 school year (TEA 2008) (See Table 2). 
Importantly, Texas student school enrollment is overwhelmingly minority, but the 
minority student population largely makes up the economically and educationally 
disadvantaged students and continues to grow. 
Figure 4-1: Enrollment by Ethnicity  
(Texas Education Agency Data) 
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Table 4-2: Student Drop Out Rate by Race 2003-2004 through 2009-2010 
 
 2003-
2004 
2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-
2008 
2008-
2009 
2009-
2010 
African American 
Students 
 
 
(1.7%) 
 
(1.7%) 
 
(5.4%) (5.8%) (5.0%) (4.4%) (3.9%) 
Hispanic Students   
(1.9%) 
 
(2.0%) 
 
(5.2%) (5.4%) (4.4%) (3.8%) (3.1%) 
White Students 
 
 
(.6%) 
 
(.7%) 
 
(1.8%) (1.5%) (1.5%) (1.3%) (1.1%) 
 
COURT CASES AND LEGISLATION RELATED TO TEXAS SCHOOL FINANCE    
Gross under-funding of districts, specifically poor minority districts, has led to 
numerous legal disputes between the state, taxpayers and school districts in the State of 
Texas over the past thirty years.  Many of these districts have declared that the public 
school finance system was insufficient, inadequate and unsuitable because of its inability 
to provide “a general diffusion of knowledge” as required by the Texas Constitution.  
Notably, there have been several instances where the Texas finance system has been 
challenged by the courts to develop a fairer and more equitable funding system, thereby 
leading to ordered revisions by the legislature.  These lawsuits also referred to as the 
Edgewood lawsuits (I-IV), were disputes on equity and how to resolve the major 
discrepancies in funding disparities between property rich and property poor districts. 
This section will review this history as it provides the context for the forthcoming 
analysis on deliberation and participation during the 3
rd
 called special session of the 79
th
 
legislature in 2006, which represents the sixth attempt by the legislature to change Texas’ 
thirty three billion dollar education system since 2003. 
The Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby (1989) court case began a 
series of lawsuits in Texas related to the disparities in spending per pupil across districts 
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hugely disadvantaging poor minority districts.  The plaintiffs in this case argued that the 
equal protection and education clause in the state constitution which requires that 
“suitable provision for the state support and maintenance of an efficient system of free 
public schools” was violated. The court ruled in favor of the property poor districts and 
deemed that the system in place was flawed and unconstitutional in terms of the 
efficiency requirements in the Texas constitution. While the state appeals court overruled 
the lower court's decision in 1989, the Texas Supreme Court in a unanimous decision 
ruled again in favor of the plaintiffs ordering the Texas legislature to revise the current 
inequitable education finance system before the 1990-1991 school year (Texas State 
Historical Association, 2001).  The extreme differences in wealth between the property 
rich and property poor districts resulted in poor districts unable to provide its students 
with an efficient education as required by the state constitution. 
The court cases continued and multiple modifications to legislation have been 
required to correct the inequities in the Texas school finance system
12
. More recently, in 
                                                 
12
  Referencing only the African American and Latino population 
 
12
 In 1990, Senate Bill 1 was enacted and consisted of legislation that required biennial studies and 
modification to address district inequity.  In addition the state increased education funding to well over 
$500 million.  However, because the structure of the education funding system remained the same, major 
disparities still resulted because the property poor districts were burdened with much heavier tax rates than 
property owners in property rich districts to generate substantially the same revenue per student for public 
education (Imazeki and Reschovsky 2003). Edgewood II was the consequence.  The Texas Supreme Court 
again ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered the legislature to create a new education funding system.  
In 1991, the legislature crafted Senate Bill 351 to remedy the equity issues brought forth by the plaintiffs in 
the Edgewood II case.  The legislation created county education districts (CEDs) which levied state 
mandated property taxes of one dollar per one hundred dollars of property value on the first $280,000 of 
property value per pupil (Texas Education Agency 2001).  The revenue would then be distributed on an 
equal per pupil basis within each district.  In 1992, Edgewood III was a result of this legislation because 
property wealthy districts argued that Senate Bill 351 was unconstitutional because voter approval was 
necessary for a tax levy and the bill essentially was mandating a statewide property tax, which is prohibited 
in the state constitution.  The court agreed that the bill essentially mandated a statewide property tax and 
deemed Senate Bill 351 unconstitutional and ordered the legislature to again rectify the education financing 
system. 
In response to the ruling by the state district court, in 1993 the 73
rd
 legislature enacted Senate Bill 7 which 
created the recapture system (also known as Robin Hood). This legislation improved equity and adequacy 
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2001, high property wealth districts filed a lawsuit (West Orange Cove vs. Neeley) which 
argued that the state's current $1.50 statutory cap on maintenance and operations tax rates 
represents an unconstitutional statewide ad valorem tax (TEA 2001).  After the case was 
sent back to trial court from the Texas Supreme Court, 285 other school districts joined 
the case as plaintiffs or interveners claiming that the school system was inadequate and 
unsuitable, and inefficient.  In November 2004 the court ruled in favor of these districts.  
It ruled that the Texas school finance system was indeed inadequate, inefficient and 
unsuitable, and that local ad valorem taxes had become a state ad valorem tax, violating 
articles in the Texas Constitution.  The court ruled that the Texas legislature could not 
distribute any money under the current Texas school finance system until they remedy 
the violations of the school funding system.  The legislature was given until October 1, 
2005 to correct for these constitutional violations.  On top of that, the court awarded the 
plaintiffs over four million dollars in attorney and court fees.  However, in November 
2005 in West Orange Cove vs. Neeley, the Texas Supreme Court partially upheld and 
partially reversed the lower court's decision.  It found that the system did not violate the 
state constitution’s education article, relying on standardized tests to validate the 
constitutional mandate that the state was providing an adequate education.  It did 
                                                                                                                                                 
of school funding by redistributing tax dollars from the state’s wealthier school districts for redistribution to 
property poor districts.  Specifically, recapture required that school districts be capped at $280,000 of 
wealth per student to achieve an equalized wealth level across the state (Texas Education Agency 2001). 
And for those districts that exceeded the $280,000 limit they had five options to share their wealth which 
included, 1) consolidating voluntarily with a poorer district; 2) moving taxable property to a poorer 
district's tax rolls; 3) sending money to the state; 4) contracting to educate students in other districts; or 5) 
merging the tax base with a poorer district's (Texas Education Agency 2001).  This system was designed to 
acknowledge and remediate the issue that property poor districts could not raise the same amount of 
revenue as property rich districts because of their low property values even at the same tax rate.  In 
Edgewood IV, the Supreme Court upheld this system and deemed Senate Bill 7 constitutional.  However, 
Edgewood V argued that mass inequities still existed because of various loopholes which allowed some 
property rich districts to avoid by small or even sometimes large measures the recapture provisions 
established in Senate Bill 7 (Imazeki and Reschovsky 2003). 
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however; maintain that the prohibition of a statewide property tax had been violated and 
required correction.  This ruling was a huge setback for the poor minority districts 
because the focus shifted from the inadequate school system and funding mechanisms to 
lowering the taxes for the wealthy districts. 
 Therefore, in 2006 House Bill 1 (HB1) was drafted which involved changes to the 
school funding plan originally adopted by the legislature in 1993 due to a new court 
mandate
13
 to modify the finance system.  A major concern of opponents is that this new 
legislation went above and beyond the court mandate and expands funding disparities 
between wealthy and poor districts, due to the reintroduction of unequalized local 
enrichment
14
.  This 2006 legislation (HB1) is the focus of this case study due to its clear 
divisiveness between the rich and poor districts
15
, which inherently divides along racial 
lines.  Below I will expound on the legislation which resulted from this ruling and 
                                                 
13
 West Orange Cove vs. Neeley resulted in the ruling that the existing level of funding provided by the 
state was “adequate”, that the state had placed an inordinate percentage of funding for TX public education 
on the backs of local school districts which required all districts to set local tax rates at the maximum level 
and resulted in a state mandated property tax that violated the TX constitutions prohibition against such 
taxes.  It also rewrote the equity standards that had been established in Edgewood I by proposing that as 
long as the state provided equitable access to a minimum education program for all school districts, it could 
allow some school districts to raise some unequalized enrichment above that level. (Cortez 2009) 
14
 Unequalized local enrichment refers to extra money raised by school districts beyond the minimum 
funding provided by the state system. 
15
 The case comprised the Edgewood Appellants which were twenty two property poor districts, several of 
whom were part of the 1980s Edgewood case.  These property poor districts comprise huge numbers of 
minority, limited English proficient (LEP), and low income students
15
.  The district court found that 
“lacking sufficient funding, property poor districts such as the Edgewood Interveners have been unable to 
provide adequate facilities for all the children in their districts” (Edgewood IV).  However, the Supreme 
Court overturned the district court ruling
15
, which was a considerable disappointment to the Interveners. 
The Supreme Court ruled that the education system the legislature has devised is adequate because it 
prescribes an education curriculum, and by means of accreditation standards, holds schools accountable for 
teaching it.  The court suggested that because schools and districts rated “academically acceptable” provide 
what is deemed an accredited education; this is indeed an education that achieves a general diffusion of 
knowledge. However, the Supreme Court upheld the District court’s decision that the tax structure for 
funding public schools was indeed unconstitutional. Consequently, the Texas legislature was charged with 
immediately complying with the Supreme Court’s ruling regarding the tax structure. Below I will expound 
on the legislation which resulted from this ruling and provide a description of how I will proceed in 
analyzing representational behavior in the context of this legislation. 
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provide a description of how I will proceed in analyzing representational behavior in the 
context of this legislation. 
THE LEGISLATION 
An examination of the deliberation among legislators on House Bill 1
16
, the 
legislation complying with the Supreme Court ruling from the West Orange Cove vs. 
Neeley case, provides a unique opportunity to empirically analyze an issue that has been 
ongoing in the state of Texas - education finance reform – specifically equity of funding 
among the school districts.   
In this case study, I will develop an original measure to analyze patterns of 
minority representatives’ language on House Bill 1 for racial perspectives during state 
legislative committee hearings. Specifically, I examine the verbal comments of Texas 
State Representatives in video transcripts of committee hearings from the Texas State 
Legislature on House Bill 1 within the Senate Finance committee, 79
th
 Legislative 
Session (2005 - 2006).  This analysis is an effort to expand the scope of the narrow body 
of work that examines race and deliberation (Canon 1999; Gamble 2005; 2007). While a 
considerable amount of literature on representation has been conducted at the 
congressional level, each of these methods will make an empirical and theoretical 
                                                 
16
House Bill 1 was drafted legislation to remedy the constitutional infirmity recognized by the court in a 
third called special session of the 79
th
 Texas Legislature.  
A summary of the legislation as reported by the House Research Organization (2006) which states 
“In HB1, the Legislature mandated a one third reduction in school district M&O taxes by tax year 2007.  
For districts now taxing at the maximum of $1.50 per $100 valuation, the base rate will drop by 11.3 
percent, to $1.33 in the 2006 tax year.  School districts would have the discretion to levy up to 4 cents per 
$100 beyond the base tax rate in enrichment taxes without voter approval.  Additional enrichment taxes 
would have to be approved by district voters in an election.  Property wealthy district will not have to 
return revenue raised by the first 4 cents (the first 6 cents, starting in 2009) of their enrichment tax under 
the “Robin Hood” recapture system, and other districts will receive additional state aid to equalize the yield 
from their enrichment tax.  State aid to equalize the yield from all M&O taxes also will increase.”   
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contribution to the literature on our understanding of minority representational behavior 
because it will provide an in depth analysis at the state level which has yet to be explored. 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY  
In order to address the research questions previously mentioned in the first section 
of this case study and to expand the scope of the narrow body of work that examines 
deliberation (Canon 1999; Gamble 2005; 2007), I develop an original measure of 
substantive representation that analyzes patterns of minority representatives’ language on 
the committee substitute
17
 to HB1 from the Senate Finance committee during the 3
rd
 
called special session of the 79
th
 legislature
18
 (2006) for minority and nonminority policy 
views during state legislative committee hearings. This special session is the sixth 
attempt to modify the Texas education funding system.  I will examine two racial 
minorities (African Americans and Latinos) during this session and compare them to their 
non-minority counterparts. 
 
Case Selection 
I chose to analyze five committee hearings of the Senate Finance committee 
revolving around the committee substitute to House Bill 1.  This committee has variation 
with regard to representatives’ race, gender, and party affiliation.  The committee has a 
total of fifteen members (see Table 4-3 below for descriptive information); one African 
American, three Latinos, and four women (one of which is Latino and holds a leadership 
position as vice committee chair). Overall, there are 5 democrats and 10 republicans.  I 
                                                 
17
 The committee substitute is an amendment of a bill in committee which provides for total replacement of 
a bill with new language, but which is relevant to and within the constraints of the subject of a bill. 
18
 The 79
th
 Legislative Session has 19 republican Senators, 12 Democratic Senators, 86 Republican State 
House representatives, and 64 House Democratic State representatives. 
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was interested in a bill that would draw out minority voices and go beyond the use of roll 
call votes to measure legislative behavior. The five hearings have a total of 15 members 
acting in one of five positions during the hearing (e.g. chair, vice chair, author, sponsor, 
and/or committee member). Thirty three percent of members were democrats, closely 
resembling the party distribution in the entire Senate. Twenty six percent are women.  
Forty eight percent of all senators were represented in this hearing.  Four of the fifteen 
(26%) Senators are minority legislators. Two out of the fifteen (roughly 13%) Senators 
were in there first term, both Republican.  The other Senators ranged from 2 to 6 terms in 
office, with the vice committee chair - a Latina woman - serving the longest of six terms. 
The two Senate sponsors on the bill were Republican. Overall, the sample statistics on 
this bill is representative of other bills and senators with regard to many important 
characteristics.   
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Table 4-3: Senator District Racial Population Demographics  
  
 
Senator 
White 
Population 
% of 
District 
African 
American 
Population 
% of 
District 
Hispanic 
Population 
% of 
District 
Term Race Party 
Nelson 82.8 5.6 13 
5th White Republican 
Staples 80.1 12.7 9.9 2nd White Republican 
Williams 80.1 13.2 8.7 2nd White Republican 
Averitt 78.3 11.2 15.1 1st White Republican 
Shapiro  
(Bill Author) 77.8 5.6 14.3 
  White Republican 
Ogden (Chair) 76.8 12 15.8 3rd White Republican 
Deull 75.7 13 14.7 2nd White Republican 
Brimer 67.5 16.2 22.9 2nd White Republican 
Janek 62.4 14.7 22.7 1st White Republican 
Duncan  61 6 31 
4th White Republican 
Whitmire 50.7 25.4 35.2 4th White Democrat 
West 34.9 40 38.9 
6th African 
American 
Democrat 
Madla 26.7 6.3 65.6 4th Hispanic Democrat 
Zaffirini (Vice 
Chair) 25.9 5.9 71 
6th Hispanic Democrat 
Hinojosa 22.5 2.3 73.4 2nd Hispanic Democrat 
 (Census 2000 District Population Statistics) 
 
 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable deliberation is based on frames developed using content 
analysis. I review taped transcripts of deliberations during the Senate committee hearing 
transcripts from HB1. The five hearings represent a total of 15.2 hours of committee 
deliberation, with a mean length of 1 hour and 52 minutes, ranging from 21 minutes to 3 
hours 27 minutes. I code each sentence and/or question by minority and non-minority 
representative’s based on a frame recognized as a minority interest or non-minority 
interest policy perspective. The frame recognized is essentially the central core of the 
packaging of an argument, and indicates what is at stake in a given piece of legislation 
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(Walsh 2002).  Coding for frames proceed as follows (as developed by Walsh 2002):  To 
allow for the possibility that minorities and non-minorities do not use different 
perspectives in committee hearings, I create the coding categories by listening to the 
hearings while blind to the racial identity of the speakers. Thus the list of code categories 
is developed in a way that minimizes my knowledge of the race of the legislator.  To 
increase the reliability of this coding procedure, I use an assistant to help develop the 
frame for this bill, and the final coding frame is one that is synthesized from each.  I also 
use an assistant to code the deliberations after the frames have been established for 
reliability
19
 of the dependent variable. 
The coding frames include policy related minority interest statements, policy 
related minority interest questions, policy related non-minority interest statements, policy 
related non-minority interest questions, factual questions, factual statements, and bill 
explanations. Policy related minority interest statements and questions include statements 
by representatives based on the frames shown below in Table 4-4.  I argue that these 
statements and questions reflect substantive representation as it produces discussion and 
viewpoints that may reveal the impact the legislation has on minority or underserved 
communities.  Non-minority interest policy questions and statements reflect questions, 
answers, or statements made by a representative related specifically to the policy i.e. 
impact, detail, rules, explanation.  Factual statements and questions are not directly 
related to the bill impact or details but may be based on responses to questions, procedure 
and/or witness testimony. The coding for bill explanation is when bill facts are clarified 
and no opinion from the representative is expressed.   
 
                                                 
19
 The intercoderreliability was 88%. 
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Table 4-4: Minority Interest Frames  
 
Minority Interest Frames 
Include: 
Poor (districts/schools ) 
Disadvantaged 
Limited English Proficiency 
African Americans 
Latinos 
Recapture 
Drop outs 
Equity 
Teacher pay raise 
Bilingual/English  
 
 
Example of the coding would be as follows: 
In this example, Senator Judith Zaffirini (D-TX) intervenes for legislation 
benefitting Latinos that may otherwise have been overlooked, yet it was 
eventually added to the final legislation: 
 
[Minority Interest Question] 
[Bilingual Frame] 
Judith Zaffirini (D-TX): “On page 52 of the committee substitute you address the 
issue of measuring the annual improvement of standard achievement and we 
talked specifically in meetings with regard to this bill that we needed to address 
the issue of testing students in dual language rather than English only, but this 
seems to reflect the original language, it doesn’t have any changes.  Are we still 
working towards this amendment?”  
 
[Factual Statement]     
Florence Shapiro (R-TX-Bill author): “Yes…”  
 
[Minority Interest Question] 
[Bilingual Frame]   
Judith Zaffirini (D-TX):  “So working toward English plus as a second language 
not just bilingual education as a remedial tool?”  
 
[Factual Statement] 
 Florence Shapiro (R-TX-Bill author): “That’s correct.”  
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RESULTS 
 
The exploratory nature of this case study provides substantive and empirical 
evidence of minority legislators providing a voice for minority constituents, namely 
providing more minority interest language on a minority interest bill in comparison to 
their nonminority colleagues. In addition to the coding example above that was actual 
deliberation that occurred during Senate Finance Committee deliberation for the 
committee substitute for House Bill 1, below I will provide additional detailed comments 
during the Senate Finance Committee deliberation that offer support for the primary 
hypothesis set forth in this project.   
 In this example, a deliberation occurred during the same committee hearing 
between an African American Senator, Royce West (D-TX) and the bill author, a White 
Female Senator, Florence Shapiro (R-TX).  Senator West takes a considerable amount of 
time to address the policy issues of recapture, equity enrichment, teacher pay raises, and 
high school allotment, each of which are profoundly important to minority interests. 
Notably, many of his areas of concern were addressed by changing the language as the 
legislation was being crafted or completely adding to the bill new amendments to ensure 
its intent, for example: 
 
Royce West (D-TX): “Senator Shapiro I want to talk about several different areas, 
recapture, equity enrichment, teacher pay raise and high school allotment…”, “As 
it relates to the high school allotment, there is a provision that if it is just for 
students ages and grades 9-12 then there are going to be a lot of ethnic minority 
kids that you lose before the 9
th
 grade.” 
 
Florence Shapiro (R-TX-Bill author): “There is a provision that states on an ADA 
basis for grades 9-12, but it can be spent on children down to 6
th
 grade.” 
 
Royce West (D-TX): “So the allotment will be for 9th-12th grade?”, “So 
realistically the money follows the children in the grades 9-12 not 6-12?”  
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Florence Shapiro (R-TX-Bill author): “Yes…”  
 
Royce West (D-TX): “See here’s the issue and maybe we can work it out, we are 
losing a lot of kids before they get to the 9
th
 grade and the question becomes if 
you are losing them before they get to the 9
th
 and develop a formula based on 9-
12 grade, is that fair for the kids 6-12?”  
 
Florence Shapiro (R-TX-Bill author): “There’s nothing that prohibits them from 
using the money for the middle school.” 
 
Royce West (D-TX):  “So realistically schools that don’t have a dropout problem 
can use it more effectively than schools that do have a dropout problem?”  
 
 Florence Shapiro (R-TX-Bill author): “I would be willing to bet that there is a 
dropout problem in almost every school district in the state.” “Almost.”  
 
Royce West (D-TX):  “Relatively speaking those with a dropout problem that 
isn’t as pronounced would have better opportunities for using these dollars.” 
  
Florence Shapiro (R-TX-Bill author): “There are other programs included in this 
amount of money, college readiness…; the problem just isn’t our dropout rate.” 
 
Royce West (D-TX): “I agree with you wholeheartedly, the question is will we 
have dollars for those schools that have significant dropout rates.”  
Royce West (D-TX): As it relates to the issue of equity, is it still the committee’s 
intention to work on the issue of equity and recapture?  
 
 Florence Shapiro (R-TX-Bill author): “Yes.” 
 
 
While this example provides some insight into the benefits of deliberation during 
committee hearings because Senator West was able to point out, clarify and voice how 
the legislation would impact schools a significant population of ethnic minority students, 
we know very little about minorities and the deliberative process and hardly any studies 
have empirically examined African-American and Latino legislator behavior and the 
legislative process (Orey 2007; Gamble 2007).  Advocates of deliberative democracy 
argue that deliberation itself is an important component of representation (Canon 1999).  
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Deliberation can change debates, agendas, and even preferences (Barber 1984; Drysek 
1990; Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Sunstein 1993). Consequently, while this case 
study only examines a small subset of deliberations among minority and non-minority 
representatives, it bridges a gap in the literature on representation and the public policy 
making process.  
 
COMPARISONS OF DELIBERATION 
 
The results of the case study suggest that there are significant differences among 
African American, Latino and Anglo legislators.  As shown in Graph 4-3 [Also See Table 
4-6 below], on average the minority representatives use minority interest language nearly 
three times as often as their Anglo counterparts. Notably, the African American 
representative uses more minority interest language than their Latino and Anglo 
counterparts combined.  Overall, the average minority interest statements and questions 
made by the eleven Anglo representatives was 3.81 (with a minimum of 0 and a max of 
12), the average minority interest statements and questions mentioned by the three Latino 
representatives was 12 (with a minimum of 4 and a max of 21), and the one African 
American (Royce West – Democrat) representative made 35 minority interest statements 
and questions.  
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Table 4-5: Descriptive Results for Senators by Race 
  
 
Another interesting finding for this case study was the language total for each of 
the groups, which shows that the White representatives spoke on average 40 times (with a 
minimum of 0 and a max of 172), the Latino representative spoke on average 39 times 
(with a minimum of 17 and a max of 51), but the one African American representative 
spoke 105 times during these committee hearings. The African American representative 
at the time was a 5th term senator but did not hold a leadership position nor was he the 
author or sponsor on the bill, whereas the chair of the committee was Anglo, the author of 
the bill was an Anglo representative, and the vice-chair was a Latina which arguably 
provided them more speaking opportunities during the committee hearings (See Graph 4-
4 below). In Graph 4-5 below, I show the amount of minority interest language in 
comparison to the total language used.  Notably the two minority democratic senators 
West and Madla use the most minority interest language relative to the total language 
they used during the committee hearings.  In addition, the Latina female senator (Judith 
 White Representatives 
 
African American and Latino 
Representatives 
 
 Mean Mean 
Term 2.8 4.25 
Incorporation .181 .25 
Minority Statements 2.54 6.75 
Minority Questions 1.27 11 
Non-Minority Statements 14.54 13.25 
Non-Minority Questions 7.45 12.5 
Minority Language Total 3.81 17.75 
Language Total 39.36 55.25 
# of Observations 12 4 
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Zaffirini) who is also the co-chair of the committee used very little minority interest 
statements nor did she speak at length in comparison to her male African American and 
Latino Democratic colleagues who are not in leadership positions.  As a result, I would 
argue that based on these observations there may be some significance with regard to my 
proposed hypothesis (H1) that minority representatives will have a greater amount of 
minority interest language on minority interest bills than will non-minority 
representatives. I intend to tease out this hypothesis (H1) and other hypotheses further in 
my dissertation. 
  
Graph 4-3: Minority Language Used by Senate Finance Committee Members 
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Graph 4-4: The Total Language Used by Senators during Committee  
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 4-5: The Total Language and Minority Interest Language 
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Furthermore, in terms of the demographic data for the representatives, it is 
important to note the minority population statistics for these representatives’ districts as 
they may play a role in how they deliberate on behalf of minority constituencies.  As 
shown below in table 6 [Insert Table 4-6 here], the average African American population 
percent for the White representatives is 12%, 40% for the African American 
representative and 4% for the Latino representatives.  The average Hispanic population 
for the White representatives is 18%, 39% for the African American representative and 
69% for the Latino representatives.  The percent of people in their district with income 
levels below $10,000 is 9.25%, 13.9%, and 15.1% for White, African American, and 
Latino representatives respectively. However, the lowest percent for the White 
representatives with this income level is 3.2%, while it is 13.9% for the African 
American and 14.8% for the Latino representative.  While the case study is but a small 
representation of a large population of state representatives, it gives credence to the 
purpose of the dissertation. 
    
Table 4-6: Averages of Demographic Information for Representatives’ District by 
Race 
 
  
 
White 
 
 
 
African American and 
Latino 
 
 Mean Mean 
Hispanic Population percent 18.41 61.18 
Foreign-Born Population 10.93 17.39 
Non-Citizen percent population 7.53 12 
Black population percent 12.32 13.28 
Voting age percent 72.47 68.56 
Public Assistance  Percent 2.45 5.8 
Income $0-$10,000 9.25 14.8 
# of Observations 11 4 
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 CONCLUSION 
 
The analysis and results of this case study while only exploratory in nature 
provide the basis for this project and contribute to the validity for taking on a project of 
this magnitude and scope. Importantly, the coding scheme was reasonable and sufficient 
to capture the impact of minority representatives during the deliberation process. The 
results provide a small degree of insight into the differences in how minority 
representatives deliberate in comparison to their non-minority counterparts.  It is evident 
that an in depth exploration into the differences in representatives’ behavior in committee 
hearings based on race will provide a fruitful contribution to the body of work on 
legislator behavior and deliberative democracy.   
My analysis draws on original data collected through committee hearing tapes and 
online video archives of Texas committee hearings in multiple policy areas, and initial 
findings indicate that minority legislators do indeed provide a voice for minority 
constituents, providing more minority interest language on minority interest bills in 
comparison to their nonminority colleagues. These initial findings support the argument 
that minority legislators do indeed substantively represent minority constituents at levels 
greater than non-minority representatives during the legislative process. Notably, these 
findings are during committee hearing deliberations and move beyond the standard 
measures of roll call votes and bill sponsorship for measures of substantive 
representation, which have shown no difference in support for minority interest 
legislation or even lower levels of support for minority interest legislation by minority 
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representatives comparative to their non-minority colleagues (Cameron, Epstein and 
O’Halloran 1996; Lublin 1997; Swain 1993).  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
MINORITY VOICES:  SAMPLING CRITERIA 
 
 
As noted in a previous chapter, deliberation is important because “increasing the 
number of minority voices represented by racially, ethnically, or aesthetically distinct 
individuals-enriches the policymaking environment” (Mansbridge 1999).  Mansbridge 
(1999) emphasizes that when descriptive representation occurs, horizontal 
communication between legislators improves, but other things equal, descriptive 
representatives are more likely than non-descriptive representatives to act as their 
descriptive constituents would like them to act when making or changing policy.  Further 
she suggests that increases in the descriptive representation of minority voices can reduce 
the tendency to dismiss claims as illegitimate or strange, and may buffer the effective use 
of institutional rules to advantage minorities.  In fact, if “these minority voices originate 
from persons having a mutually interactive relationship with disadvantaged groups and 
from sharing a commitment to dispossessed subgroups within said groups, representation 
and democracy are advanced even further” (Dovi 2002). It is because of what normative 
theorists define as this racial group consciousness, which asserts that racial or ethnic 
group minorities are more likely to represent the interests of marginalized groups in the 
policy making process (William 1998; Young 2000), that the shared experiences of the 
minority legislators will bring different viewpoints and understandings of the causes of 
problems and conflicts, as well as the possible effects of proposed solutions to minorities 
during committee deliberation (Minta 2011). 
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 Thus, minorities are more likely during deliberation to make a substantive 
contribution during committee hearings.  More specifically, the following hypotheses 
detail expectations about minority representatives. 
H1: Minority representatives will have higher committee hearing attendance rates on 
minority interest bills in comparison to their non-minority counterparts, holding all 
things constant. 
H2: Minority representatives will have a greater amount of minority interest 
language on minority interest bills than will non-minority representatives, holding all 
things constant. 
 
To study whether minorities provide substantive representation during committee 
hearings, I sampled bills chosen from Texas which had a committee hearing.  The bills 
are determined by a strict set of criteria using inter-coder reliability to draw the sample.  
The sampling procedure is intended to contribute to the representation literature by 
implementing a systematic sampling method. The sampling methods used are chosen 
based on committee jurisdictions and areas that have been historically perceived as 
minority interest because they disproportionately affect these constituents such as, 
immigration and bilingual education (Sanchez 2006), as well as health, social welfare, 
education, civil rights and employment opportunity issues (Haynie 2001).     
In Texas, the House and Senate are both divided into standing committees which 
handle hundreds and sometimes thousands of bills during each legislative session. I 
sampled bills from the 81
st
 Legislature (2009), 80
th
 Legislature (2007) and 78
th
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Legislature (2003) that passed through committee
20
 and were identified as major 
legislation during each of the legislative sessions based on information from the Texas 
House Research Organization (HRO)
21
 (see Table 3-1 from the previous chapter).  
Second, the committees must have minority legislators.  The sample must include 
committees with minority legislator membership otherwise the analysis is null
22
. Table 5-
3 shows the prerequisite for bill selection which requires minority legislator membership 
on the committee in question hearing the minority interest legislation. Please note that 
Table 5-3 indicates the number of African Americans, Latinos, and their total percent of 
the committee membership. During the 78
th
, 80
th
, and 81
st
 legislative sessions, the 
committees selected have at least 11% and up to 67% minority membership. 
 
Table 5-2: The graph below highlights the selection criteria 
 Committee Representation 
Bill Type Minorities on Committee No Minorities on Committee 
Minority interest Yes (H1& H2) N/A 
Non-minority interest N/A N/A 
 
[Insert Table 5-3 here] 
 
 
When a bill is introduced by its author, it is then assigned to a specific committee 
based on the subject matter of the bill and which committee holds jurisdiction of that 
specific subject matter.  Therefore, in addition to choosing bills that have been heard in 
                                                 
20
 Bills that died in committee, never received a hearing, or no action was taken on a proposed motion or 
amendment were excluded from the dataset. 
21
 Based on information from the Texas House Research Organization (HRO) – The House Research 
Organization (HRO) is a nonpartisan independent department of the Texas House of Representatives. It 
provides impartial information on legislation and issues before the Texas Legislature. This is similar to 
Walsh’s (2002) design which examines deliberative contributions among women on major legislation 
related and non-related to women issues. 
22
 Table 5-2 is a brief illustration of how the selected bills for minority interest will measure the 
aforementioned hypothesis. 
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committee and have minority legislator membership, I also identify committees that have 
jurisdictions which include areas that address or could reasonably be assumed to have 
greater impacts on minorities than on non-minorities.  For instance, there are fourteen 
jurisdictions that may overwhelmingly affect minority populations which include: 
appropriating money; provision of public services; civil law, including rights, duties, 
remedies, and procedures; alternatives to incarceration; criminal law, prohibitions, and 
standards; right of suffrage; education beyond high school; welfare and rehabilitation 
programs; public schools and the financing thereof; protection of public health; 
legislative districts, house and senate, any changes; congressional districts, creation, 
changes; problems and issues of metropolitan areas; and all proposals to modify, amend 
or change any existing state tax or revenue statute.  I identify the committees that contain 
one of these jurisdictions with minority legislator membership.  Hence, the committees 
include: Corrections, Redistricting, Urban Affairs, Border and Intergovernmental Affairs, 
Elections, Public Education, State Affairs, Human Services, Appropriations, and Public 
Health.  Table 5-4 illustrates the number of bills heard in the House committee, which is 
the primary prerequisite for the sample because in order to code deliberation the bill has 
to make it to the committee hearing phase of the legislative process. The table includes 
the total number of bills in the sample that had committee hearings during the 81
st
, 80
th
, 
and 78
th
 legislature (74 bills), and also the number of bills that relate to minority interest 
(34 bills). 
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Table 5-4: Committees and the Minority Bills Sample Statistics 
 
Committee 
 
Qualifying Bills 
(# Bills Heard in 
Committee) 
*78th, 80th and 81st Legislature 
Minority Interest 
Bills Sample 
(Chosen by bill 
topic) 
Appropriations 7 1 
Corrections 5 3 
Redistricting 1 1 
Urban Affairs 1 0 
Border and 
Intergovernmental 
Affairs 
0 0 
Public Education 18 12 
Public Health  12 3 
Elections 4 2 
Higher Education 8 4 
Human Services 4 3 
State Affairs 14 5 
Total  74 34 
 
 
From these committees there was a final sample of minority interest bills of 34, 
and from this sample I randomly chose 9 minority interest bills, shown in Table 5-5. 
There is variation of the bills with regard to committee, number of minority legislators on 
those committees, and legislative session.  Specifically, there are four bills from the 81
st
 
legislative session, four from the 80
th
 legislative session, and one from the 78
th
 legislative 
session.  There is one from the higher education committee, four from Public Education, 
two from Health and Human Services, one from Elections and one from Corrections.  
Each bill chosen is from a committee that has 11% or more minority membership. 
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Table 5-5: Actual Bill Sample 
Bill Legislative 
Session 
Committee Author Minority 
Representation 
Issue 
HB 159 80th Higher Ed Zedler 1 AA 
1 Latino 
22% of total 
membership 
Determination of 
resident status of 
students by public 
universities 
*HB 
3646 
81st Public Ed Hochberg 2 AA 
2 L 
36% 
public school 
finance and 
programs 
*HB 
2814 
80th Public Ed Eissler 1 AA 
2L 
38% 
pilot project in 
certain school 
districts for dual 
language ed in 
English and 
another language 
HB 5 on 
school 
finance 
78th Public Ed Staples 1 AA 
1 L 
22% 
relating to 
mentoring 
services 
programs for at 
risk students in 
public schools 
*HB 130 81st Public Ed Patrick 2 AA 
2 L 
36% 
Relating to an 
enhanced 
quality full-day 
prekindergarten 
program 
provided by 
public school 
districts in 
conjunction 
with community 
providers. 
*HB 
2962 
81st Health and 
Human 
Services 
Coleman 1 AA 
1 L 
18% 
Relating to the 
administration 
and funding of 
and eligibility 
for the child 
health plan, 
medical 
assistance, and 
other programs. 
HB 109 80
th
 Health and 
Human 
Services 
Turner X CHIPS 
Eligibility 
Provision 
HB 218 80
th
 Elections B. Brown X Requiring voters 
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to present proof 
of id 
HB 1711 81st Corrections Turner 2 AA 
3 L 
45% 
Relating to 
requiring the 
Texas 
Department of 
Criminal Justice 
to establish a 
comprehensive 
reentry and 
reintegration 
plan for 
offenders 
released or 
discharged from 
a correctional 
facility. 
 
 
Overall, bill selection is based on bills: heard in committee hearing in either of these 
legislatures,  containing minority membership on the committee, identified as minority 
interest because it explicitly deals with race,  falls within a committee jurisdiction that 
disproportionately affects a minority group (i.e. immigration), and/or bill language 
specifically identifying a minority constituency.   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 5-3: Minority Interest Committees and Minority Representation 
Listed in the following order -81st Legislature (2009)/ 80th Legislature (2007)/ 78th Legislature (2003) 
 
 
*Also note based on the preliminary analysis from the case study chapter there is no indication that a critical mass of minorities must be 
present for deliberation to occur on behalf of minority interests. 
 Higher Ed  Corrections Elections Public 
Education 
State 
Affairs 
Human 
Services 
Approp
riations  
Public 
Health 
Urban 
Affairs 
# of African 
Americans 
0/1/3 2/0/0 1/0/2 2/1/1 1/1/1 0/0/0 4/4/4 1/1/1 2/0/1 
# of Latinos 2/1/3 3/1/2 2/2/1 2/2/1 5/1/1 3/1/4 4/5/4 1/2/2 3/2/1 
Total %age of 
committee 
membership 
22%/22%/67% 45%/14%/29% 33%/29%/43% 36%/38%/22% 40%/25%/22% 33%/11%/44% 30%/32%/
29% 
18%/38%/
33% 
45%/29%/2
9% 
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CHAPTER 6 
MINORITY VOICES: DELIBERATION ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
 
In this chapter, I provide the analysis from the efforts of legislators to infuse a 
discussion of minority interest topics on key legislation based on the research design in 
the previous chapter. Specifically, I take a closer look at the statements made and 
questions asked  regarding minority and underserved populations during the 78
th 
(2003), 
80
th 
(2007), and 81
st 
(2009) committee hearings in state legislative sessions in Texas. I 
argue that ethnic group consciousness produces systematic racial and ethnic differences 
between minority and non-minority legislators: African American and Latino legislators 
actively discuss and bring forth minority interest topics in committee hearing discussions. 
Specifically, I assess the substantive role minority legislators play regarding minority 
representation during the policy making process by examining the actual statements and 
questions raised in deliberations to ensure minority impact is assessed. I focus on 
exchanges that legislators have with one another but also with public witnesses that offer 
testimony at the hearings. I concentrate on the substance of the language used by both 
minority and non-minority legislators and the statements made to the witnesses and by 
the witnesses that may ignite a discussion around how the bill impacts minorities.  
While the earlier chapter on participation, which examines the differences 
between minority and non-minority legislators, finds that minority legislators indeed 
participate at greater levels on minority interest legislation in comparison to non-minority 
interest legislation, confirms my hypothesis regarding higher levels of commitment to 
minority interest. The analysis did not confirm the hypothesis that minority legislator 
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participation levels were greater than non-minority legislators. Though participation 
activity is an important piece of the puzzle regarding substantive representation, this 
chapter goes further and provides a systematic analysis of their deliberative efforts while 
in attendance at the committee hearings. Do the minority legislators enhance deliberation 
by bringing a distinctive voice into the dialogue? Are they speaking up more often in 
comparison to their White colleagues on behalf of minorities? These questions are 
important to ask because minority representation scholars generally measure substantive 
representation as roll call voting and other activities surrounding bill sponsorship and co-
sponsorship, but do not address the fact that legislators provide other substantive rolls 
during the policy making process. Surprisingly, few minority representation scholars 
have examined substantive representation beyond roll call votes. Mansbridge (1999) and 
Williams (1998) theorized that representation is much more than roll call voting and 
deliberation is a key component, but empirically they have not tested deliberation. 
Gamble (2007) and Minta (2011) are exceptions as they explore deliberative concepts in 
committee hearings, which is the path this work follows and expands on at the state level. 
The focus on state legislatures is key because in recent years many states’ 
minority populations have grown and with this growth state policies have become 
increasingly vital to the interests of these growing populations. Consequently, the growth 
has resulted in an increase in the number of African American and Latinos elected to 
state legislatures. Moreover, the growth at both levels has resulted in greater attention and 
legislation that is favorable and unfavorable to minorities.  Hedrick (2011) finds that 
immigration legislation from 2005 to 2011 was roughly 42% anti-immigrant legislation 
and 50% integrative legislation which attempts to expand the rights and access of 
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immigrants.  However, more recently in 2011 there has been significant anti-immigrant 
legislation in comparison to integrative legislation (Hedrick 2011). For example, 
Alabama and Arizona in 2011 passed what are arguably the harshest immigration laws in 
the country.  Arizona House Bill 56 (HB 56) and Alabama Senate Bill 1070 (SB 1070) 
are both states’ recent immigration laws that include language which requires proof of 
citizenship. In addition, SB 1070 requires schools to determine and document citizenship 
status of students, and prohibits renting and/or transporting illegal immigrants. Both laws 
are viewed as extremely restrictive and even considered a threat to civil rights by both 
African Americans and Latinos.  African American and Latino legislators and 
organizations have banded together on this legislation as well as other legislation that 
they feel negatively impacts minority populations. Bernard Simelton, president of the 
NAACP Alabama State Conference, spoke out against SB 1070 and stated that "we 
cannot be satisfied and we will not be satisfied until our state, the state of Alabama treats 
us all as equal". One of the arguments regarding the unfairness of HB 56 surrounds the 
limited debate that occurred on the bill. For instance, Democratic Senator Bill Beasley 
stated “when the bill [HB56] came through the Senate, it had very limited debate,” “I felt 
at that time that it was a cruel law, that it was discriminatory, that it would create 
profiling”. In addition, Olivia Turner of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) said 
“they are just shoehorning these bills in, and there’s been no due deliberation or even 
time for a proper reading and comprehension of these bills”.  While the impact of 
deliberation on policy outcomes is not being examined in this dissertation, undoubtedly it 
plays a significant role. This work is the beginning of the conversation on the substantive 
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impact of minority voices during deliberation on legislation, specifically the distinctive 
perspective they bring during the policy making process. 
There are multiple ways through which legislators can make an impact during the 
policy making process; the mechanism I assess measures legislators’ involvement in state 
committee hearings.  Committee hearings are vehicles which provide unprecedented 
opportunities for exploration of the impact of legislation on the overall population as well 
as specific constituencies. The significant number of minority and party based interest 
groups that testify in support or against minority interest legislation at committee 
hearings supports this idea.  In addition, the deliberation that occurs among legislators is 
also impactful and necessary for “good policy”, which Fenno (2003) points out is one of 
the goals of legislators beyond re-election. For example, the House Speaker of the 
Vermont Legislature Walter Freed, “appointed Democrats to committees who were 
strong advocates for the minority position, in order to allow full and free debate on issues 
within each committee” (Squire and Hamm 2005). Furthermore, the deliberations among 
legislators and the public in committee hearings advantage legislators because they 
garner support for their priority legislation. “Cheryl Miller (1990) found that African 
American legislators strategically used their dispersion and leadership on various 
committees in order to improve the probability of passage of their priority legislation” 
(Haynie 2001). In the following sections, I examine the individual efforts of legislators to 
advocate for minority interest in committee hearing deliberation on minority interest 
legislation.  
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
The bills analyzed for this chapter are chosen based on the sampling scheme 
explained in the previous chapter. The idea is that these bills would draw out minority 
voices and go beyond the use of roll call votes to measure legislative behavior.  
Therefore, I laboriously listen and code committee hearing transcripts on the bills listed 
in Table 5-4 held during the 78
th
, 80
th
, and 81st sessions.  In the process of collecting this 
data I acquired as much information as possible about the committee process and the bills 
by reading newspaper clippings, interviewing state legislators, and also consulting with 
legislative staff.  While this dissertation does have some limitations because of the nature 
of the data collection process, it indeed provides an in-depth picture of deliberation that 
hopes to contribute to the literature in an insightful way. I believe that it will lay some 
foundation for future research on deliberation.  
  
Descriptive Statistics  
The nine hearings represent a total of 62 hours and 36 minutes of committee 
deliberation, with committee hearings ranging in length from 49 minutes to over 8 hours.  
The nine hearings have a total of 78 members
23
  acting in one of five positions during the 
hearing (e.g. chair, vice chair, author, sponsor, and/or committee member), however this 
number does not include overlap of legislators across sessions.  The following are the 
statistics for the entire sample. Forty-six percent (46%) of the observations were 
democrats
24
, closely resembling the party distribution in the entire House. Twenty 
                                                 
23
 9 (78
th
), 36 (80
th
), and 33 (81
st
) are the total number of members in each session analyzed. 
24
 44% (78
th
), 37% (80
th
), and 53% (81
st
) is the percentage of democrat observations in each session. 
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percent (20%) are women
25
. Thirty percent (30%) are minorities
26
.  None of the 
legislators were in their first term.  Seniority ranged from 2 to 14 terms in office.  
Overall, the sample statistics on these bills are representative of the entire lower house on 
many important characteristics.  
Operational Definitions  
 
  The dependent variables, “attendance”, and “deliberation” are proxies for the 
intensity of minority state legislators’ commitment to advocating on behalf of African 
American and Latino populations.  Similar to Gamble’s (2007) concept of participation 
and deliberation respectively in Congressional hearings, which shows how often 
legislators participate and speak in committee hearings. Consequently, I am able to 
determine if minority legislators are first showing up at hearings that impact minorities 
and if they advocate on behalf of minorities when they are in attendance.  In the 
following text I discuss how I measure and operationalize these concepts. 
 
 Deliberation: The dependent variable deliberation is based on frames developed using 
content analysis. I review taped transcripts of deliberations during committee hearing 
transcripts from sampled bills (Table 4), I code each sentence and/or question by minority 
and non-minority representative’s based on a frame recognized as a minority interest 
policy perspective. The frame recognized is essentially the central core of the packaging 
of an argument, and indicates what is at stake in a given piece of legislation (Walsh 
2002).  Coding for frames proceed as follows (adapted by Minta 2011 and Walsh 2002):  
To allow for the possibility that minorities and non-minorities use different perspectives 
                                                 
25
 11% (78
th
), 20% (80
th
), 25% (81
st
) is the percentage of women observations in each session. 
26
 22% (78
th
), 23% (80
th
), 39% (81
st
) is the percentage of minority observations in each session . 
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in committee hearings, I create the coding categories based on the arguments set forth in 
the document by the nonpartisan House Research Organization. Thus the list of code 
categories is developed in a way that minimizes my knowledge of the race of the 
legislator.  To increase the reliability of this coding procedure, I use an assistant to help 
develop the frame for a small sample of the bills, and the final coding frame will be one 
that is synthesized from each.  I also use an assistant to code the deliberations after the 
frames have been established for reliability of the dependent variable. Minority interest 
frames include: minorities, African Americans, Blacks, Latinos, Hispanics, Equity, 
migrant worker(s), immigrants, legal/illegal immigrants, minority interest group (ex. 
LULAC, NAACP), bilingual, low income, poor, disadvantaged, English as a second 
language, dropouts, recapture, and teacher pay raise. The criteria used to assess these 
frames are explained in appendix B.  
 
Attendance: The dependent variable attendance is a dummy variable for whether the 
legislator was counted as present (1) or absent (0) in the hearing transcript. 
 
Key Independent Variable: Race of representative (Bratton and Haynie 1999), which 
includes minority representatives (African American and Latino legislators) coded as 1 in 
comparison to non-minority representatives coded as 0. 
 
Control Variables: I control for a number of variables that have been demonstrated to 
affect substantive representation (See Table 6-1).  I hypothesize a positive relationship 
for minority legislators on each of these variables, which include: democrat (Jacobson 
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1992) a dummy variable where 0 is republican and 1 is democrat; seniority coded as a 
dummy variable where 0 represents a legislator in their first term and 1 represents 
legislators who have served terms in office greater than 1 - because scholars have found 
that senior members are more likely to participate actively in committee deliberations 
(Cook 1986; Squire 1988, Hibbing 1991, 1993); electoral instability (Minta 2009); 
political incorporation, coded as 0 to 2, member, vice-chair, and chair respectively are 
leadership positions because the literature finds that when minority representatives hold 
positions of power over specific policy areas minority group influence over that specific 
policy increases (Preuhs 2006); female coded 0 and 1, male and female respectively; bill 
author, coded as a dummy variable 0 (not the bill author) and 1 (bill author); and district 
characteristics as it plays an important role in legislative behavior (e.g. black/Latino 
district population percent, family income, urban/rural percent, foreign born percent) 
(Rouse 2008). Specifically, Latino and African American populations within a district 
have shown legislators more responsive to their interests (Canon 1999; Haynie 2001; 
Fraga et al 2003).  
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Table 6-1: Control Variables and Hypothesized Relationship 
Concept Indicator Hypothesized Relationship 
on Deliberation of 
Minority Interest Bills 
Representation (DV) # of African American and 
Latino State Legislators 
+ 
Political Incorporation Committee Vice Chair or 
Chair 
+ 
Broad Incorporation Outside
27
 Committee Vice 
Chair or Chair  
+ 
Party Democrat + 
Seniority Terms in office + 
Gender Female + 
Bill Author Bill author + 
District Characteristics % Urban + 
% African American and 
Latino  
+ 
Income Income Below $10,000 + 
 
I consolidate the collected data for deliberation into categories based on language 
type – minority interest language, non-minority interest language, and all language. 
Minority Interest language is the pooled deliberation data for each legislator that consists 
of policy related minority interest statements and questions. Non-minority interest 
language is the pooled deliberation data for policy related non-minority interest 
statements and questions. All language includes both minority and non-minority interest 
language as described, in addition to non-policy related language (i.e. factual statements, 
factual questions, and bill explanation). See appendix B for details on the following 
categories. It was necessary to consolidate the data because there are not enough 
observations for each dimension to support a multivariate analysis of the noted 
hypotheses.  
                                                 
27
 Outside committee chair is legislator who holds a committee chair or vice chair position in the 
legislature, not in the committee being analyzed.  
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I conduct the analysis on multiple levels. I conduct a difference of means test on 
attendance, deliberation, and incorporation to analyze the differences between minorities 
and non-minorities by language types. I chose the logit model to estimate the attendance 
of minority and non-minority representatives on minority interest legislation. The 
purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the intensity of preferences of legislators to involve 
themselves on legislation that is important to minorities, simply by showing up or not 
showing up. Finally, I chose the negative binomial regression model to estimate the 
preference of legislators beyond simply showing up, but participation in the deliberative 
components of minority legislation once they are in attendance at the committee hearing. 
This model estimates the amount of minority interest and non-minority interest language 
by legislators if they are in attendance at the committee hearing on minority interest bills.  
Table 6-2 shows the summary statistics on the key variables. As shown, there are 
123 observations with the individual legislators as the unit of analysis.   The maximum 
for minority interest language is 15 with zero as the minimum; therefore during any one 
of the committee hearings, the most minority interest language used by any one legislator 
was 15 statements and/or questions related to the policy.  Interestingly, the mean for 
minority interest statements is relatively low at .862 which indicates that legislators 
discussing minority interest topics are not dominant even on minority interest legislation. 
The maximum for non-minority interest language is 26 with zero as the minimum; 
therefore during any one of the committee hearings, the most non-minority interest 
language used by any one legislator was 26 statements and/or questions related to the 
policy. The mean for non-minority interest language is 2.34, which is noticeably higher 
than the minority interest language, but also showing that minority interest language does 
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not dominate the discussion even when considering bills that have a significant impact on 
minority populations. The maximum for all language is 53 with zero as the minimum; 
therefore during any one of the committee hearings, the most language used by any one 
legislator was 53 statements and/or questions. Predictably all language has a high 
maximum with a higher mean of 5.44 in comparison to minority and non-minority 
interest language because it includes them both in addition to responses to questions and 
bill explanation.  
 
Table 6-2 Summary Statistics for Language Types 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Minority Interest 
Language 
123 .862 2. 43 0 15 
Non-Minority 
Interest Language 
123 2.34 4.68 0 26 
All Language 123 5.44 10.46 0 53 
 
 
 
The data suggest some differences exist between minority and non-minority 
representatives with regard to attendance at committee hearings.  As shown in Table 6-3 
minorities attend committee hearings at lower rates than their non-minority counterparts, 
evidenced by mean attendance scores of .702 to .918, statistically significant at the p<.05 
level. This finding is contrary to my hypothesis that minorities would have higher 
attendance rates on minority interest legislation. Considering that one of the few extant 
studies on representation and participation at the committee level finds that African 
American legislators are more likely than whites to participate in committee activities 
when black interest policies are involved (Gamble 2007), it is important to dig deeper 
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into these findings.  Potentially, it may be the demand on the minority legislators’ time as 
Grose (2011) suggests that there are other activities outside of the legislature that 
minority representatives spend considerable time at higher rates than their white 
counterparts.  Therefore, I anticipate the lower attendance rates may be a result of other 
demands on the minority legislators’ time which may include, but not limited to, 
simultaneous committee meetings and constituent service in the district.  
With regard to deliberation, racial differences are more apparent after attendance 
is taken into account. As shown in Table 6-4, when minorities attend the committee 
hearings their deliberation scores exceed their white counterparts, congruent with my 
hypothesis that minorities will have higher scores for minority interest language in 
comparison to their non-minority counterparts. Across all language types minorities have 
higher average mean scores compared to non-minorities, however not statistically 
significant. Additionally, there is a positive correlation (.059) for minority interest 
language and minority legislators and a negative correlation (-.059) or white legislators 
and minority interest language.  Indeed, minorities substantively represent minority 
constituents in committee hearing deliberation when they are present at rates much higher 
than their non-minority counterparts.  
Table 6-3: Minorities vs. Non-Minorities: Difference of Means Test for Attendance 
 
 Attendance 
Minorities .702 (.076)** 
Non-Minorities .918 (.029)** 
# of Observation 123 
Significant at P<.01***, P -value <.05**, P-value <.10* 
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Table 6-4: Minorities vs. Non-Minorities: Difference of Means Test for Attending 
Legislators by Language Type 
 All 
Language 
Minority 
Interest 
Language 
Non-Minority 
Interest 
Language 
Minorities 7.07  (2.31) 1.53 (.633) 3.23 (1.15)  
Non-
Minorities 
6.08  (1.22) .835 (.265) 2.55 (.523) 
# of Observations 105 105 105 
Significant at P<.01***, P –value <.05**, P-value <.10*  
 
Leadership positions play a role in deliberation efforts. Table 6-5 shows where 
race plays an even more significant role, specifically when the minority legislators hold 
leadership positions. The data shows that incorporated minorities (minorities holding 
committee leadership positions) deliberate in committee hearings using more minority 
interest language on minority interest bills in comparison to their incorporated non-
minority counterparts, represented by minority interest language means of 2.66 to 1.11, 
however not a statistically significant difference. And overall, incorporated minorities 
deliberate more in committee hearings on minority interest bills in comparison to their 
incorporated non-minority counterparts, represented by all language means of 14.33 to 
10, however not a statistically significant difference. These findings magnify the 
importance of minorities and the difference they make when they are included in the 
power structure of politics.   
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Table 6-5: Incorporated Minorities vs. Incorporated Non-Minorities: Difference of Means 
Test by Language Type 
 All 
Language 
Minority 
Interest 
Language 
Non-
Minority 
Interest 
Language 
Incorporated 
Minorities 
14.33 (8.08) 2.66 (.400) 7.33 
(4.33) 
Incorporated 
Non-Minorities 
10 (2.534) 1.11 (2.18) 3.62 
(.817) 
# of Observations 30 30 30 
Significant at P<.01***, P –value <.05**, P-value <.10*  
 
The multivariate results from the logit model in Table 6-6 shows that minorities 
have slightly above a 50/50 chance of attending hearings on minority interest bills in 
comparison to their non-minority counterparts
28
. The positive coefficient for minority 
means that the likelihood of attendance did increase with race, however not statistically 
significant. Similarly, the positive coefficient for incorporation, broad incorporation, bill 
author, and the percent of non-citizens in a district have an increased likelihood in 
attending minority interest, all of which are statistically significant. These results support 
findings in the extant literature on the positive impact minorities who hold leadership 
positions have on changes in policy which may translate to significant positive 
substantive results for minorities (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28
 A logit model is the best fit for the data because a Logit model estimates the probability of the dependent variable to be 1 (Y=1). 
Overall the model is well done signified by the chi2 which is statistically significant at the p<.01 level, showing that the coefficients in 
the model are different than zero.  
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Table 6-6: Legislator Attendance on Major Minority Interest Legislation 
Logit Regression  
Variable Attendance (Logit) Attendance 
  (Odds Ratio) 
Minorities 0.065 1.067 
 (-1.834) (-1.958) 
Incorporation 2.181***  8.858***  
 (-0.534) (-4.733) 
Broad Incorporation 1.951**  7.041** 
 (-0.829) (-5.838) 
Female -0.487 0.614 
 (-0.743) (-0.456) 
Democrat -1.129 0.323 
 (-1.488) -0.481 
Bill Author 1.488* 4.431* 
 (-0.917) (-4.065) 
Seniority -0.279* 0.756* 
 (-0.159) (-0.121) 
Income below $10,000 -0.029 0.971 
 (-0.102)  (-0.099) 
Non Citizen Percent 0.114* 1.121* 
 (-0.064) (-0.072) 
%  Urban 0.012 1.012 
 (-0.022) (-0.022) 
Minority Population % 0.003 1.003 
 (-0.027) (-0.027) 
Constant 0.727   
 (-1.93)  
N 122 122 
Chi2 .000*** .000*** 
Pseudo R
2
 0.283   
 Significant at P<.01***, P -value <.05**, P-value <.10*               
Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis  
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DISENTANGLING RACE AND MINORITY POPULATION EFFECTS 
The additional analysis for this chapter on deliberation proceeds in a way that 
examines both race and minority population as appropriate variables for predicting 
substantive representation. Until recently (Grose 2011), most scholars have found that 
district population and party were most predictive for substantive representation in 
comparison to race.  However, the primary reason scholars have analyzed race and 
minority population in separate models is due to multi-collinearity issues i.e. both 
variables tend to be highly correlated and often lead to inflated standard errors when 
examining the impact of these variables within the same model.  Similarly, I run into a 
comparable problem and examine the variables in two separate models.  However, I 
employ two models – one that accounts for minority population and party without race 
(table 6-7) and another model that examines race without minority population and party 
(table 6-8).  With the exception of Canon (1999) and most recently Grose (2011), most 
scholars examine only one model to make their conclusions on the predictive effects of 
race, minority population, and party on substantive representation.  
 The results in Table 6-7 address the question in the literature: Does the minority 
population percentage affect substantive representation? As stated above, this question 
has been answered based on work at the congressional level, in majority African 
American districts, and without regard to the race of the legislator because of issues of 
collinearity (Lublin 1997; Swain 1995). Most scholars have found that majority minority 
districts maximize substantive representation, particularly for African Americans 
(Cameron, Epstein, O’Halloran 1996; Canon 1999; Swain 1995; Whitby and Krause 
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2001). For example, Whitby (1997) in one of the prominent works on black 
representation suggests that both race and district population are important, but does not 
use the district population of blacks in his model due to multicollinearity. Conversely, 
Swain (1995) in her seminal work suggests that race is not as predictive as minority 
population when examining legislator responsiveness to minority populations, but does 
not use race as a variable in the quantitative analysis also due to multicollinearity.  
The multivariate results from the negative binomial regression for the 
demographic model in table 6-7 confirm that minority population percentages have a 
significant and positive effect on deliberation, similar to Canon’s (1999) seminal work 
and others in the representation literature. Specifically, the higher the district minority 
population the greater the amount of language (all language and minority interest 
language) used in committee hearing deliberations on minority interest bills. These 
findings were particularly true for white democrats with high minority populations. 
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Table 6-7: Minority Deliberation Analysis on Major Minority Bills 
Negative Binomial Regression (Demographic Model)   
Variable All Language Minority 
Interest 
Language 
 
 
Minority 
Population .024** 
(0.009) 
.036** 
(.017) 
Democrat .353 
(.425) 
.045 
(.599) 
Incorporation 0.885*** 
(0.174) 
0.781** 
(0.346) 
Broad 
Incorporation .015 
(0.324) 
-.039 
(0.470) 
Bill Author  -.430 
(0.404) 
-.443 
(0.515) 
Seniority .156*** 
(0.008) 
0.112 
(0.082) 
Income below 
$10,000 -.118** 
(0.055) 
-0.020 
(0.069) 
Female 0.664 
(0.578) 
.927 
(0.725) 
Constant -.033 
(0.497) 
-3.076*** 
(.906) 
Log Pseudo 
Likelihood 
-258.806 -113.292 
Wald chi-square 
(2) 
53.46 26.78 
Alpha 2.68 
P<.001*** 
4.42 
P<.001*** 
N 104 104 
Significant at P<.01***, P -value <.05**, P-value <.10*     
  Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis 
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The results in table 6-8 addresses the question set forth in the beginning of this 
dissertation: Does descriptive representation lead to substantive representation?  Using 
committee deliberation as the dependent variable, which again is relatively unexplored in 
the literature on minority representation in comparison to other outputs like roll call 
votes, I find that the quality of representation on issues that minorities tend to support is 
positively impacted by race. 
The multivariate results from the negative binomial regression for the race model 
in table 6-8 shows a positive direction for race and minority interest language used in 
committee hearing deliberation on minority interest bills, however not statistically 
significant. I anticipate that the low number of minority representatives in the sample 
may contribute to the lack of significance. But as shown in the difference of means test 
earlier in this chapter, minority representatives on average deliberate using minority 
interest language more often than their white colleagues. Further, Grose (2010, 2011) 
finds that even when the black population of the district is considered, African American 
legislators provide greater substantive representation. The other variables related to 
previous results on substantive representation, incorporation and seniority are included to 
control for factors specific to each legislator. They are both positive and significantly 
related to deliberation.  
More specifically, the multivariate results from the negative binomial regression 
for the race model in table 6-8 confirms that incorporated committee members and 
members who have served longer in the legislature were likely to deliberate more using 
all language on minority interest bills. This was not the case for the use of minority 
interest language on minority interest bills. Incorporated members did deliberate more 
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using minority interest language in comparison to their non-incorporated counterparts, 
however not statistically significant.  
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Table 6-8: Minority Deliberation Analysis on Major Minority Bills 
Negative Binomial Regression (Race Model)  
Variable All Language Minority 
Interest 
Language 
 
Minorities 
          .615 
(0.609) 
.614 
(.661) 
Incorporation 0.749*** 
(0.221) 
0.436 
(0.342) 
Broad 
Incorporation -0.182 
(0.355) 
-.417 
(0.465) 
Bill Author  -.566 
(0.448) 
-.377 
(0.552) 
Seniority .197*** 
(0.061) 
0.170** 
(0.072) 
Income below 
$10,000 -.050 
(0.055) 
0.071 
(0.061) 
Female 0.338 
(0.569) 
.302 
(0.683) 
Constant .679 
(0.557) 
-2.053** 
(.867) 
Log Pseudo 
Likelihood 
-261.780 -115.580 
Wald chi-square 
(2) 
26.11 11.43 
Alpha 2.89 
P<.001*** 
5.97 
P<.1* 
N 104 104 
Significant at P<.01***, P -value <.05**, P-value <.10*      
 Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis 
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The two models add to the literature in a way that disentangles the individual 
components that have consistently played a positive role in substantive representation for 
minority interests. However, the contribution of this work is using committee deliberation 
as the dependent variable, which again is relatively unexplored in the literature on 
minority representation in comparison to other outputs like roll call votes.  
The analysis suggests that some differences exist between the way minority 
representatives and white representatives deliberate on behalf of minority interests during 
committee hearings. The raw data shows that 22% of White members have minority 
language scores greater than 0, but 26% of minority representatives have minority 
language scores greater than 0, supportive of my hypotheses. In the next few sections, I 
present instances from specific committee hearings that show how minority members 
expand the deliberation in ways that consider minority interests.  
 
In-State Tuition and Non-Citizens 
H.B. 159 in the 80th legislative session would have eliminated the ability of non-
citizens to receive in-state tuition in Texas. The bill was a major initiative pushed by 
Texas Republicans. There were two arguments used during committee hearings on HB 
159. Supporters of the legislation argued that it would encourage illegal behavior and it 
incentivized illegal behavior to illegal immigrants breaking the law. Opponents of the 
legislation argued that regardless of citizenship status it was good policy to educate Texas 
residents. They argued that “undocumented students who have grown up in the United 
States and graduate from American high schools should not be punished for the actions of 
parents who brought them illegally to this country” (HRO 2007).  Representative Jessica 
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Farrar (Latina Democrat) was key during the committee hearing on this legislation as she 
participated in multiple exchanges with witnesses who supported and opposed the bill. 
She ensured that deliberation occurred by asking questions of witnesses - mainly 
Hispanic students - that brought life to “uncrystallized” (Mansbridge 1999) viewpoints.  
Her participation centered the discussion on how the bill would leave these students with 
no hope for a future because it removed the provision that these same students could 
receive in-state tuition. Her efforts infused the debate with minority viewpoints because 
she asked questions of witnesses that would help them articulate how the bill would be 
extremely personally detrimental. Interestingly, she did not have high minority language 
scores, however she had significant all language scores due to the exchanges she had 
with witnesses. Indeed, her contribution expanded deliberation to include minority 
voices, in a way that would not have occurred without her participation. 
 
Voter ID Bill 
H.B. 218 in the 80
th
 legislative session would have required a voter to present a 
valid voter registration card and either one form of photo identification or two different 
forms of non-photo identification. This was an extremely controversial bill also supported 
by the Texas Republican party. Supporters of the legislation argued that it would reduce 
the massive amounts of voter fraud occurring in Texas and restore confidence in elections 
by raising the bar by instituting these standards. Opponents of the bill argued that this 
requirement would increase the burden to vote and dampen voter participation of certain 
groups, including minorities, people with disabilities, and the elderly and low income 
voters. They also argued that the claims of voter fraud were unsubstantiated and 
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anecdotal at best. The deliberation during committee showed the Latino representatives 
presenting facts and asking questions that created considerable dialogue around the issue 
of voter fraud and disenfranchisement. Representative Anchia (Latino Democrat) 
opposed the bill and infused the deliberation with the perspective that this bill may 
disenfranchise voters. Below I will detail a conversation between Representative Anchia 
and Ms. Benkiser a public witness as an example to how he expanded the deliberation to 
include a perspective that spoke to minorities’ concerns. The conversation begins after 
Ms. Benkiser has voiced her support of the bill and suggests that passing the bill is the 
only responsible thing to do and necessary to ensure justice for all. 
Representative Anchia: “You just stated and I think very appropriately that 
every qualified citizen should have the right to vote. I agree with you. I think 
it is among one of the most important rights. Again the tension and my 
concern is whether we are restricting the franchise and specifically my 
concern is about the voter registration and having to prove you are a citizen 
to be a registered voter. And you probably agree with me that your testimony 
here today is an important right. I think it forms part of your right to 
address the government right?” 
 
Ms. Benkiser: “Absolutely.” 
 
Representative Anchia: “you know…your right to speech. You would also 
agree that the right to register to vote is at least a co-equal right with what 
you are doing here today. Correct? It’s at least as important.” 
 
Ms. Benkiser: “Absolutely. The right to vote and to self govern is the 
underpinning foundation to our American system of government.”  
 
Representative Anchia: “And in order to do that and the requirement in 
these bills is you have to prove you are a citizen correct?” 
 
Ms. Benkiser: “I believe not only is it a requirement in these bills but I 
believe it is a U.S. constitutional requirement that one be a citizen to vote.” 
 
Representative Anchia: “And I totally agree with that…my concern is how 
do you prove it. Can you prove today that you are a citizen?” 
 
Ms. Benkiser: “Yes Sir, I can.” 
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Representative Anchia: “Do you have your passport, citizenship papers?” 
 
Ms. Benkiser: “I don’t have them right now.” 
 
Representative Anchia: “But if I were going to register you to vote right now, 
could you prove you are a citizen, right now?” 
 
Ms. Benkiser: “Mr. Anchia, I appreciate what you are trying to say, the point 
is if I were here to register to vote, yes sir I could prove it and it wouldn’t be 
very much trouble.” 
 
Representative Anchia: “But if you weren’t registered and I was trying to 
register you now, could you right now prove you were a citizen?” 
 
Ms. Benkiser: “It would depend what you required from me as proof”. 
 
Representative Anchia: “Under the bill. Do you have your passport?” 
 
Ms. Benkiser: “No” 
 
Representative Anchia: “Citizenship papers?”  
 
Ms. Benkiser: “No I don’t” 
 
Representative Anchia: “What is the 3rd thing under the bill?...birth 
certificate?” “Do you have your birth certificate with you?  
 
Ms. Benkiser: “Not with me” 
 
Representative Anchia: “That’s the reason I am trying to articulate this 
tension, whether we are really restricting…giving people a tough time 
registering to vote, because I agree with you…every qualified citizen should 
have the right to vote. I worry this bill creates a problem. I appreciate you 
walking through that exercise with me because I like you don’t want voter 
fraud. I have an issue preventing access.” 
 
This dialogue in many ways points to the deliberative contributions of Representative 
Anchia, particularly regarding the issue of disenfranchisement that many civil rights 
organizations, minority interest groups as well as minority citizens have voiced as a 
major concern over this type of legislation. In coding this conversation, similar to the 
  
103 
 
above example, Representative Anchia would not have received high scores on minority 
interest language however; this exchange accounts for all language spoken, undoubtedly 
advocating for minority voices.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter of the dissertation project while not irrefutable regarding the role of 
race and deliberation it provides worthwhile findings for future research in the area of 
substantive representation and how it is measured. For example, it is evident that Latino 
and African American legislators tend to discuss the concerns of minorities and other 
marginalized constituencies during state legislative committee hearings. Particularly, 
minority representatives engage, ask questions, and at times challenge public witnesses 
who support legislation that may be detrimental to minority interest. This was evident in 
the bills that I detailed above (HB 159 and HB 218) when minority representatives had 
increased levels of minority interest language as well as non-minority interest language; 
but on bills that were more favorable to minorities, like HB 1711, there was only one 
instance where a minority representative (African American Representative Sylvester 
Turner) used minority interest language. This is an important finding because while the 
findings do not show significance for minorities on all minority interest legislation 
examined, when analyzing the data further it shows considerable evidence of minority 
representatives advocating on behalf of minority constituents when the legislation is 
threatening to minority populations. More specifically, minorities have significantly 
higher minority interest language mean scores (3.88) in comparison to their non-minority 
counterparts (.294) on legislation that is viewed as a threat to minority interest (see table 
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6-9 below). The same trend is found for minorities and non-minorities using all language 
on threatening bills with means of (14.66) and (7.74) respectively. I conduct a negative 
binomial regression for the purpose of examining these relationships further and again 
find significant positive relationships for minority representatives and their use of 
minority interest language on these threatening bills. Clearly, these results point to a 
substantive point of impact that minorities bring to the deliberative process.  
 
Table 6-9: Difference of Means Test of Minority Language used on Threatening versus 
Non-Threatening Minority Interest Bills by Race 
Bill Direction Non-
Minorities 
Minorities* 
Minority Interest Non-
Threat 
0.272 0.294* 
Minority Interest Threat* 1.54 3.88* 
                   Significant at P<.01***, P -value <.05**, P-value <.10* 
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Table 6-10: Negative Binomial Regression of Race and Deliberation on Threatening 
Bills 
Variable All Language 
Minorities 1.275* 
(0.689) 
Incorporation -.209 
(0.723) 
Broad Incorporation -0.766 
(0.784) 
Bill Author  1.719 
(1.480) 
Seniority .179** 
(0.077) 
Income below $10,000 -.022 
(0.094) 
Female -1.607 
(1.01) 
Constant .737 
(1.17) 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -121.44 
Wald chi-square (7) 25.21 
Alpha 2.82 
P<.001*** 
N 44 
Significant at P<.01***, P -value <.05**, P-value <.10* 
With current rates of unfavorable legislation that target minority groups increasing 
(Hedrick 2011), I hope this research is a catalyst to improve our understanding of the 
substantive roles that minority representatives play during the policy process, particularly 
at the committee level.   
 The aggregate implications of this analysis are that legislators from districts with 
high levels of African American and Latino populations achieve substantive 
representation (consistent with previous work). Similar to past work, I estimated and 
found minority populations significant to substantive representation. While race played a 
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positive role in legislators advocating for minority interests in committee hearings, it was 
not significant, yet it is evident that minority representatives expand the discussion and 
provide perspectives not offered by their white colleagues. I also find evidence that 
incorporated minorities play a distinctive role in deliberative aspects of the policy process 
and do indeed play a crucial role in the advancement of minority interests on legislation. 
Thus, as I disentangle minority constituencies and race, I conclude that both electing 
minority legislators and having districts with large minority populations have a positive 
impact on substantive representation of minority interests during the policy making 
process.  Further, minority legislators who hold leadership positions play a positive role 
in greater substantive representation.  
Additionally, by utilizing this new data set in expanding the definition of 
substantive representation, this research attempts to advance the scholarly literature.  
Future research should examine whether these patterns exist in other state legislatures. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION  
 
Does descriptive representation lead to substantive representation? This is the big 
question examined in this dissertation and it considers the role that race of public officials 
play in influencing their behavior during the policy making process and to what extent 
race motivates their efforts in working on issues that come before the legislature. 
Previous scholars find that minority interests are served just as well by non-minority 
representatives and at times better represented (Swain 1993; Thernstrom 1987). The 
evidence during committee hearings in the Texas House during the 78
th
, 80
th
, and 81
st
 
legislative sessions is contrary to these findings. While white representatives attended 
committee hearings (minority interest and non-minority interest) more often than 
minority representatives, there were sizeable differences in the participation levels and 
the degree minority representatives advocated on behalf of minority interests. African 
American and Latino representatives spent generous amounts of time during committee 
hearings, engaging witnesses, gathering information, questioning erroneous statements, 
and presenting information that would positively impact important legislation, like 
education, healthcare, and voting rights. While, the findings regarding the impact of  race 
on deliberation and participation was not irrefutable, based on the data collected, the 
findings regarding incorporated minorities was positive and significant, suggesting that 
institutional mechanisms like increased staff and greater resources for committee 
leadership had positive impacts on the ability for minority representatives to advocate on 
behalf of minority populations.  
Additionally, this dissertation is my attempt to expand the definition of 
substantive representation to include deliberative aspects of the policy making process to 
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better understand the role of race and substantive representation. Political theorists 
continually suggest the impact that inclusive deliberation and diversity has on 
representative democracy (Mansbridge 1999; Williams 1998) and institutions that do not 
include certain groups are unlikely to be viewed as equitable by those historically 
excluded (Minta 2011), yet the increase of elected officials across all electoral institutions 
particularly state legislatures has been unexplored when examining deliberative aspects 
of the legislative process.  Subsequently, the focus on committees is also a contribution of 
this dissertation because few scholars have examined deliberation in committees which 
are viewed as primary deliberative arenas (Minta 2011; Gamble 2007), and very little 
research has been conducted at the state level.  
The steps I take in this dissertation are for the purpose of understanding the links 
between race, deliberation and representation. First, I analyze the differences in 
attendance and participation between minority and white representatives regarding 
attendance on major legislation because in order to capture the deliberative aspects during 
the committee hearings, the legislator must first show up. It also provides an area other 
than roll-call voting that show the contributions minority representatives make during the 
policy process. Second, I perform a case study on a controversial education bill in the 
Texas Senate as an exploratory measure and I find that the data collecting methods were 
feasible for expanding the project. I conducted informal interviews with legislators and 
staff members and I also collected massive amounts of data to ensure I had the most 
accurate information for capturing minority interests. Third, I produced a systematic way 
to determine minority interests, divergent from the representation literature that generally 
determines minority interests via objective and subjective measures (Haynie 2000).  Last, 
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after coding over 77 hours of committee hearing transcripts, I am able to empirically 
examine the individual legislator behavior of white and minority representatives during 
committee deliberation on minority interest bills.   
Similar to Gamble’s (2007) and Minta’s (2011) work I find that in certain 
instances, having a minority legislator present for committee deliberations, legitimizes 
and expands deliberation creating a more inclusive process.  Although both white and 
minority democrats spent time engaging in deliberations in support of minorities, African 
American and Latino representatives consistently spent the most time engaging witnesses 
and their fellow colleagues on issues specific to minorities from the controversial voter 
ID law which sought to disproportionately disenfranchise minorities for nothing more 
than unsubstantiated claims of voter fraud to discussions on adequacy versus equity in 
education. At first glance these findings seem less than overwhelming in support of my 
hypothesis; however, when the perceived interest of minorities is threatened the findings 
are quite clear and support my hypothesis that minority representatives deliberate on 
behalf of minority interests more so than their non-minority counterparts. This was a key 
finding and an area for expansion in future research because the literature usually 
distinguishes legislation as general and specific Latino or African American interest 
(Rouse 2008), and salient versus non-salient but not necessarily focusing on the direction 
(threatening versus non-threatening) of the minority legislation under analysis. Minta 
(2011) touches on this idea as he considers the tone of the statements made by 
congressional legislators (positive, neutral, or negative) in his analysis and finds 
significant positive results for minorities advocating on behalf of minority populations, 
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but still his legislation differentiates along the lines of social welfare policy and civil 
rights legislation. 
  Even more poignant was the discovery of the impact that minorities holding 
leadership positions had during deliberative aspects, particularly I found significant and 
positive differences regarding participation and deliberation. Generally, committee 
leaders have more resources and staff support, enabling them to participate more on time 
intensive aspects of the legislative process like committee hearings (Minta 2011).  
These discoveries will also lead to future studies in the area of deliberation 
because a thorough understanding of the impact that leadership positions play in the 
deliberative process is warranted and lacking
29
. 
Implications  
 
African American and Latino representatives can and do provide a voice for 
marginalized constituencies, and their participation in committee hearings can shape the 
nature of the debate (Minta 2011). The ability for minority legislators to challenge 
stereotypes typically imparted on minorities is necessary and indispensable. The findings 
in chapter 3, 4 and 6 provide some support, but not irrefutable evidence, for the important 
                                                 
29
 The work of Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984) begins to investigate the effect of institutional 
incorporation in local politics and find that minority representatives must be incorporated into the dominant 
political regime in order to exert influence over policy decisions. Their analysis is at the city level (10 cities 
within same state), while this analysis is at the state level.  Subsequently, Haynie (2001) finds that the 
effects of higher African American incorporation are not superior to the effects of increased African 
American descriptive representation at the state level.  However he does find that institutional incorporation 
does have a positive, significant effect on education expenditures.  The more recent work of Preuhs (2006) 
follows up this work at the state level investigating lower chambers and finds that when minority 
representatives hold positions of power over specific policy areas, minority group influence over that 
specific policy increases.   The only relevant significant relationships he finds were in Democratic-
controlled states where black education committee chairs and broad institutional incorporation were 
negatively related to per pupil expenditures.  He notes that his analysis does a poor job accounting for 
extraneous and economic variables, potentially lending meaningless results. So while Preuh’s (2006) and 
Haynie’s (2001)  work is evidence that research in the area of state research and representation is not futile, 
uncovering the representational consequences of the institutional mechanisms at the state level is an area 
scholars have contradictory findings and have only begun to discover.   
  
111 
 
link between race and representation during deliberative functions in the Texas state 
legislature. With the increasing populations of minority populations in the United States 
it is important that our electoral system reflects these changes, but tradeoffs do exist. 
Concentrating minority populations in one district, subsequently leads to more 
Republican legislators in other districts who tend to pass legislation that is not favorable 
to minorities.  
The purpose of this dissertation is not to dispute the value that white 
representatives bring to their African American and Latino populations; rather, it 
emphasizes the important role that minorities play in contributing to the policy making 
process through their distinctive voice and viewpoints during committee hearings. As a 
result of their participation during the process beyond roll call votes, the goal is that 
electoral bodies such as state legislatures will make better policy decisions because of 
their inclusion in the deliberation process. Studying the impact of race on committees 
forces us to take a step back in the policy process and reevaluate what it means to 
substantively represent constituents interests by advancing our understanding of the link 
between committee deliberations and governing. 
 
 
FUTURE AREAS OF RESEARCH 
 
 Research on representation focuses on a single state or at the congressional level, 
however state legislatures provide an excellent venue for examining them fascinating 
dynamic. Because states vary in the balance between legislative parties, party cohesion, 
political culture, institutions, norms, and professionalism the consequences for 
representation is worth exploring. Therefore in the future I will expand this study to 
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multiple states. Below I will provide a glimpse of how I intend to expand this research 
project in the future.  
 
Professionalization 
I would argue that institutional structure has an impact on behavior.  The literature 
states that any comparative state project must take into account the varying levels of 
legislative professionalization across states (Squire and Hamm 2005).  That is, because 
more professionalized legislatures tend to have power less centralized in the hands of 
leaders (Squire 1992), larger staffs that can gather policy information, and legislators that 
are better paid and full time allowing for time to research policy implications on all 
constituencies leading to better decision making.  While, in less professionalized 
legislatures, legislators tend to be poorly or not paid at all, serve only short sessions - 
meeting annually or sometimes biannually, have limited staffs, thereby limiting their 
ability to fully understand policy impact.  Therefore one might expect that more 
professional state legislatures are more likely to participate and deliberate more on 
minority and non minority interest bills because of this institutional structure.  
Specifically, the following hypotheses detail these expectations. 
H5: As legislature professionalism increases, minorities will participate and use 
more minority interest language on minority interest bills than on non-minority 
interest bills.  
H6: As legislature professionalism increases, minority representatives will 
participate at higher rates on minority interest bills than on non minority interest 
bills than will non minority representatives.  
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Term Limits 
 A second key institutional variable is whether term limits are enforced in a given 
state. Term limits are important because it changes the legislative relationship with 
constituents. Specifically, term limits do not change the type of member elected but 
reorder policy preferences and increase influence of other political actors in the policy 
making process (Carey, Niemi & Powell 1998).  Therefore, the following hypotheses are 
based on these findings. 
H5:  Minorities will participate and use more minority interest language on 
minority interest bills than on non minority interest bills in states with no term 
limits in comparison to states with term limits. 
H6: Minority representatives will participate at higher rates on minority interest 
bills than non minority interest bills than will non minority representatives in 
states with no term limits in comparison to states with term limits. 
 
Research Design 
In order to address the research questions previously mentioned and to expand the 
scope of the narrow body of work that examines deliberation (Canon 1999; Gamble 
2005; 2007), I will perform an analysis of minority legislator participation rates on bills. 
In addition, I will perform content analysis of minority representatives’ language on bills 
for minority interest perspectives during state legislative committee hearings.  While a 
considerable amount of literature on representation has been conducted at the 
congressional level, each of these methods will make an empirical and theoretical 
contribution to the literature on our understanding of minority representational behavior 
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because it will provide an in depth, multiple contexts and multiple session analysis at the 
state level which has yet to be explored.  Below I will provide some insight into why I 
chose to study specific states within this project.  
The sample of states chose indeed capture variation at institutional and contextual 
levels, providing for an analysis that will make a theoretical and empirical contribution. 
The most important factor for this research project in studying minorities is choosing 
states with significant African American and/or Latino populations. Thus, the states 
chosen are sampled from among the twenty two most minority populated states within 
the United States (U.S. Census 2000).  Secondly, prerequisites based on two very key 
institutional mechanisms I am interested in studying include term limits and legislative 
professionalization.  Since it is impossible to conduct research across all 22 states, I will 
sample from the distribution of states listed. Therefore the result of the states for analysis 
is limited to California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, Arizona, Louisiana, Texas, 
Connecticut, New Mexico, and Georgia. As shown below in Table 7-1, the states are 
distributed across the two key variables, professionalization and term limits, outlining the 
variation in detail. Four of the ten states employ term limits and they range in terms of 
professionalization on a scale of low, medium, and high (Kurtz 1992). I intend to study 
states with both high African American and Latino populations (see Table 7-2), but also 
states with high populations of each (see Table 7-3 and 7-4). For instance Louisiana has 
an African American population of 32.5% and a Latino population of 2.4% with term 
limits, whereas New Mexico has a Latino population of 42.1% and an African American 
population of 1.9% with no term limits.  Table 2 below shows the states demographic 
information in more detail. 
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Table 7-1 – Professionalization and Term Limit Variation 
 
Professionalization 
 
Term 
Limits 
High Medium Low 
 
Yes 
California
3
 
Florida
1
 
Michigan
2
 
Ohio
2
 
 
Arizona
3
 
Louisiana
2
 
Alabama
2
 
 
N/A 
 
No 
Illinois
1
 
New Jersey
1,
 
NewYork
1
 
Pennsylvania
2
 
Massachussetts
3
 
 
Texas
1
 
Connecticut
1
 
North Carolina
2
 
Virginia
2
 
South Carolina
2
 
Arkansas
2
 
Maryland
2
 
 
New Mexico
3
 
Georgia
2
 
Mississippi
2
 
Highlighted cells indicate the states I will examine from the sample of states meeting the 
institutional and demographic selection criteria 
1 – States with both high (over 9% of the populations) African American and Latino 
Populations  
2 – States with high African American population, low (below 5% of the population) 
Latino population 
3 – States with high (over 9% of the populations) Latino population, low (below 5% of 
the population) African American population  
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Table 7-2 - States with High Black and Latino Populations 
 
 
State 
 
Black Population 
 
Hispanic 
Population 
*Texas 11.5% 32.0% 
Florida 14.6% 16.8% 
Illinois 15.1% 12.3% 
Connecticut 9.1% 9.4% 
New Jersey 13.6% 13.3% 
**Dissertation analysis is Texas  
 
Table 7-3 – States with High Latino populations 
 
 
State 
 
Black Population 
 
Hispanic 
Population 
California 6.7% 32.4% 
Arizona 3.1% 25.3% 
New Mexico 1.9% 42.1% 
 
Table 7-4 - States with High Black Populations 
 
 
State 
 
Black Population 
 
Hispanic 
Population 
Georgia 28.7% 5.3% 
Louisiana 32.5% 2.4% 
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Methods  
 
I will employ the above hypotheses using cross-sectional state level and individual 
level data for ten states between 2002-2012. A sub-national analysis of these ten states 
offers a range of institutional, political and cultural contexts and variation from more than 
one legislative body, in order to expand the empirical and theoretical basis of this line of 
study. In addition, this analysis will also offer the opportunity to check generalizability of 
representation theory, but also evaluate the impact of the institutional contexts on these 
theories. The unit of analysis is the participation of the representative.  Notably, none of 
the states with the professionalization designation of low with term limits fit the base line 
criteria. 
To study whether minorities provide substantive representation during committee 
meetings, sampled bills chosen from the ten states will be restricted to major legislation 
that passed.  It will be determined by a strict set of criteria using inter-coder reliability to 
draw the sample.  They will be chosen based on areas that have been historically 
perceived as minority interest areas such as, immigration and bilingual education 
(Sanchez 2006), as well as health, social welfare, education, civil rights and employment 
opportunity issues (Haynie 2001).  There will also be bills sampled that are not typically 
considered minority interest bills.   
To conduct this study I will use the following operational definitions for the key 
variables. My decisions about how to measure and operationalize these concepts are 
based on the same definitions in previous chapters.  In the following text I discuss how I 
measure and operationalize concepts that will be used in addition to deliberation, 
participation, and standard controls.    
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A1: Professionalization: The independent variable professionalization will be coded 
based on the three levels of professionalization developed by (Kurtz 1992), i.e. citizen, 
hybrid and professional (coded 0, 1, and 2 respectively). Professional legislatures are 
ones that are in session the majority of the year, have larger personal staff, and are the 
highest paid more, distinctly opposite are citizen legislatures.  Hybrid legislatures are in 
between, with more resources and staff than their citizen counterparts but much less than 
the professionalized legislatures. 
A2: Term Limits: The independent variable term limits will be coded 0 or 1, where 1 is a 
state with term limits and 0 is one without.   
This study will contribute to the discipline by advancing our understanding of 
how minority representation impacts the legislative policy making process, specifically 
using a new innovative quantitative assessment of deliberation. It will make a significant 
contribution to our understanding of diversity on the deliberative process, but equally 
important it will highlight the impact of deliberation, considering it is one of our most 
fundamental democratic principles. A multi-state study will provide diversity on multiple 
contextual and institutional levels that will perhaps contribute to a foundation on which 
key theoretical generalizations can be built. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
LIST OF BILLS FOR DATA SET 
 
Subject Area of Bill  Session  Bill Number/Author and Description 
*Indicates Enrolled Bill 
1. Civil Liability 78th HB 4 Nixon Revising medical malpractice and 
tort liability laws 
2. Criminal Justice 78th HB 614 Keel Prohibiting death sentence for 
person found mentally retarded  
3. Economic 
Development and 
Finance 
78th * HB 2668 Allen Requiring probation for 
possession of certain controlled substances 
4. Economic 
Development and 
Finance 
78th * HB 2703 Bailey Making evidence tested by 
unaccredited crime laboratory inadmissible 
5. Economic 
Development and 
Finance 
78th HB 730 Ritter Creating the Texas Residential 
Construction Commission  
6. Economic 
Development and 
Finance 
78th * HB 1282 McCall Restricting unsolicited 
commercial e-mail or “spam”  
7. Economic 
Development and 
Finance 
78th HB 1407 Hupp Allowing exhibition of 
amusement redemption machines by charities  
8. Elections 78th HB 54 Wolens Enhancing penalties for fraud in 
early voting by mail 
9. Elections 78th * HB 1549 Denny Implementing the Help 
America Vote Act 
10. Elections 78th * HB 2496 Branch Changing the dates of 
primary elections  
11. Environment 78th HB 1365 Bonnen Funding the Texas Emissions 
Reduction Plan  
12. Environment 78th * HB 1457 Eiland Suspending enforcement of 
the public beach access law 
13. Environment 78th * HB 1567 West Licensing a private entity to 
dispose of low-level radioactive waste 
14. Environment 78th * HB 3152 Bonnen Amending requirements for 
removing contaminants from groundwater  
15. Families and 78th HB 15 Corte Requiring informed consent from 
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Children a woman before abortion  
16. Families and 
Children 
78th * HB 729 Goodman Regulating gestational 
agreements under the Uniform Parentage Act  
17. Families and 
Children 
78th HB 1175 King Prohibiting human cloning 
18. Families and 
Children 
78th HB 1911 Talton Prohibiting placement of foster 
child with homosexual or bisexual parents  
19. Government 
Affairs 
78th HB 2/ SB 1952 Swinford Omnibus government 
reform initiatives  
20. Government 
Affairs 
78th * HB 9 Flores Establishing a statewide 
homeland security strategy  
21. Government 
Affairs 
78th HB 568 Mowery Prohibiting involuntary 
annexation  
22. Government 
Affairs 
78th * HB 1606 Wolens Revising ethics laws and 
Texas Ethics Commission procedures  
23. Government 
Affairs 
78th * HB 2933 Flores Transferring Commission on 
Human Rights to Texas Workforce 
Commission 
24. Health and Human 
Services 
78th HB 1920/HB 1921/SB 43/SB 486 Capelo 
Revising state policies on child immunization  
25. Health and Human 
Services 
78th * HB 2292 Wohlgemuth Reorganizing health 
and human services agencies  
26. Health and Human 
Services 
78th * HB 2985 Capelo Creating a patient protection 
office within the Health Professions Council 
27. Higher Education 78th HB 1887 Morrison Allowing public universities 
to retain overhead expenses  
28. Higher Education 78th * HB 3015 Morrison Deregulating tuition at 
public higher education institutions  
29. Higher Education 78th * HB 3526 Hamric Consolidating two higher 
education excellence funds  
30. Insurance 78th HB 329 Naishtat Requiring licensing and 
regulation of mold assessors and remediators 
31. Judiciary 78th HB 599 Chisum Continuing the State Bar of 
Texas 
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32. Public Education 78th HB 5 Grusendorf Changing public school 
finance and restructuring the state tax system  
33. Public Education 78th HB 580 Nixon Allowing parochial and private 
schools to join University Interscholastic 
League  
34. Public Education 78th HB 859 Madden Deregulating home-rule 
charters and changing election procedures  
35. Public Education 78th HB 1554 Grusendorf Authorizing state funding 
for virtual charter schools  
36. Public Education 78th HB 2465 Grusendorf Creating a publicly 
funded school voucher pilot program  
37. Public Education 78th * HB 3459 Pitts Appropriations-related changes 
to education statutes  
38. Public Employees 78th HB 3208 Heflin Authorizing lump-sum bonus 
payments to certain retiring state employees  
39. Public Employees 78th * HB 3257 Delisi Creating a health 
reimbursement arrangement program for school 
employees  
40. Redistricting 78th HB 3398 Crabb Redrawing Texas 
congressional districts 
41. Taxation and 
Revenue 
78th HB 53/ HB 267/HB 1603/HB 3192/SB 
1153Wolens Increasing cigarette taxes to pay 
for various programs  
42. Taxation and 
Revenue 
78th * HB 2425 McCall Implementing the multistate 
streamlined sales tax initiative  
43. Taxation and 
Revenue 
78th * HB 2458 Krusee Rewriting the motor-fuel tax 
code and changing the collection point  
44. Taxation and 
Revenue 
78th HB 3146 Wilson Extending the franchise tax to 
additional business concerns  
45. Taxation and 
Revenue 
78th HB 3223 Bohac Limiting increases in real 
property appraisals for nonschool taxes  
46. Taxation and 
Revenue 
78th HJR 2/ HB 3207 Heflin Requiring repayment to 
the rainy day fund  
47. Transportation and 
Motor Vehicles 
78th HB 814/ SB 422/HB 3588 Gutierrez Creating a 
motor-vehicle financial responsibility 
verification program  
48. Transportation and 
Motor Vehicles 
78th HB 901 King Authorizing photographic traffic-
signal enforcement by cities  
49. Transportation and 78th * HB 2971 Harper-Brown Standardizing, 
marketing, and creating new specialty license 
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Motor Vehicles plates  
50. Transportation and 
Motor Vehicles 
78th * HB 3588 Krusee Trans-Texas Corridor and 
transportation policy and funding revisions  
51. Transportation and 
Motor Vehicles 
78th HJR 28/ HB 471Pickett Short-term 
transportation borrowing and highway revenue 
bonding  
52. Business 
Regulation and 
Economic Development  
80th HB 1038 Ritter Revising operation of Texas 
Residential Construction Commission 
53. Business 
Regulation and 
Economic Development  
80th * HB 1634 Dukes Incentives for film, 
television, and related industries  
54. Business 
Regulation and 
Economic Development  
80th * HB 3358 Smithee Prohibiting insurance rate 
increases during judicial review  
55. Business 
Regulation and 
Economic Development  
80th HB 2960 Smithee Restructuring the Texas 
Windstorm Insurance Association  
56. Criminal Justice  80th HB 8 Riddle Death penalty, other punishments 
for repeat sex crimes committed against 
children  
57. Criminal Justice  80th * HB 1355 Gattis Felony for owners of dogs 
causing serious bodily injury or death  
58. Criminal Justice  80th * HB 2328 Woolley Cruelty to animals 
penalties  
59. Criminal Justice  80th HB 3200 Madden State basic supervision 
funding for local probation departments  
60. Elections  80th HB 218 B. Brown Requiring voters to present 
proof of identification 42 
61. Elections  80th * HB 556 Hilderbran Exemption for disabled 
voter accessibility in certain elections 44  
62. Elections  80th HB 626 P. King Proving U.S. citizenship to 
register to vote 46  
63. Elections  80th HB 2017 Giddings Moving the primary election 
date to the first Tuesday in February 48 
64. Environment  80th HB 12 Hilderbran Funding and jurisdiction of 
TPWD and Historical Commission 52 
65. Environment  80th * HB 3732/HJR 93 Hardcastle Chisum 
Implementation of advanced clean energy 
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projects 
66. Families and 
Children 
** HB 2685 Chisum/ Marriage license fee waiver 
for premarital education/ * HB 2683 Chisum 
Marriage promotion grants  
67. Government 
Affairs  
80th HB 10 Chavez Prosecution defense for certain 
gambling for Native American tribes  
68. Government 
Affairs  
80th HB 13 Swinford Homeland security, border 
security, TDEx database, immigration 
enforcement 
69. Government 
Affairs  
80th HB 28 Berman Illegal immigration restrictions: 
Prohibiting children of illegal immigrants from 
receiving state benefits  
70. Government 
Affairs  
80th HB 461 Miller Prohibiting mandatory 
participation in an animal ID system  
71. Government 
Affairs  
80th * HB 991 Rose Limiting disclosure of 
concealed handgun licensees  
72. Government 
Affairs  
80th HB 2006 Woolley Revised standards for 
authority to use eminent domain power  
73. Government 
Affairs 
80th * HJR 19 Branch Requiring legislators to cast 
record votes  
74. Health and Human 
Services  
80th HB 9 Crownover Banning smoking in all 
workplaces and public places  
75. Health and Human 
Services  
80th * HB 14 Keffer/ * HJR 90 Keffer Cancer 
research funding  
76. Health and Human 
Services  
80th * HB 109 Turner Children’s Health Insurance 
Program eligibility revisions  
77. Health and Human 
Services  
80th * HB 1098 Bonnen Preventing HPV vaccine 
from being required for admission to school  
78. Health and Human 
Services  
80th * HB 3575 Rose Monitoring and update of 
HHS eligibility systems  
79. Health and Human 
Services  
80th HB 3778 Rose Nursing home quality assurance 
fee  
80. Higher Education  80th HB 159 Zedler Determination of resident status 
of students by public universities 124 
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81. Higher Education  80th * HB 3826 Morrison High school curriculum 
requirements for higher education admission 
126  
82. Higher Education  80th HB 3828 Morrison Performance incentive 
funding for higher education institutions 127 
83. Higher Education  80th * HB 3900 Morrison Establishing the Texas 
Tomorrow Fund II prepaid tuition program  
84. Judiciary 80th HB 1602 Van Arsdale Amending venue rules 
for lawsuits involving maritime workers 
85. Public Education  80th HB 1287 Chisum Adding study of the Bible as 
public school elective course  
86. Public Education  80th HB 1387 P. King Requiring school districts to 
conduct feasibility studies before taking land  
87. Public Education  80th * HB 2237 Eissler Programs and grants for 
dropout prevention, high school success, and 
college readiness  
88. Public Education  80th * HB 2532 Patrick Alternative school 
placement of students expelled for felonies and 
registered sex offenders 
89. Public Education  80th * HB 2814 Eissler Requiring TEA to establish a 
dual language education pilot program 
90. Public Education  80th * HB 3678 C. Howard Voluntary expression of 
religious viewpoints in public schools  
91. Taxation and 
Revenue  
80th HB 216 Otto Increasing school district margin 
of error in comptroller’s property value study  
92. Taxation and 
Revenue  
80th * HB 1751 Cohen Entry fee for sexually 
oriented businesses to fund sexual assault 
prevention  
93. Taxation and 
Revenue  
80th HB 2785 Paxton Further compression of school 
district property tax rates  
94. Taxation and 
Revenue  
80th * HB 2994 Bonnen Allowing limitations on 
appraised value for nuclear and coal 
gasification plants 
95. Taxation and 
Revenue  
80th HB 3821 Villareal Mandatory property sales 
price disclosure 
96. Taxation and 
Revenue  
80th * HB 3928 Keffer Correcting and modifying 
the revised franchise tax 
97. Taxation and 
Revenue  
80th * SJR 13 Averitt/* HB 5 Berman Proportionate 
reduction in elderly and disabled school tax 
freeze amount 
98. Transportation  80th HB 323 Hamilton Three-point seat belts for 
school buses 190  
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99. Transportation  80th HB 1439 Chisum Driver record monitoring 
pilot program  
100. Utilities  80th HB 735 Straus Repealing the 
Telecommunications Infrastructure Fund 
assessment 206 
101. Utilities  80th * HB 1090 Swinford Grants to encourage 
electric energy generation with biomass 
materials 207 
102. Utilities  80th * HB 3693 Straus Electricity efficiency and 
conservation incentives  
103. Business 
Regulation and 
Economic Development 
81st HB 873 Duke State incentives for media 
productions 
104. Business 
Regulation and 
Economic Development 
81st  HB 2295 McClendon Continuing the Texas 
Residential Construction Commissio 
105. Business 
Regulation and 
Economic Development 
81st  HB 4409 Taylor/ SB 14 Fraser Restructuring 
the Texas Windstorm Insurance Association 
(TWIA) 
106. Business 
Regulation and 
Economic Development 
81st * HB 3676 Heflin Extending school district 
property-value limitation agreements 
107. Business 
Regulation and 
Economic Development 
81st * HB 3896 Oliveira Revising and extending 
local tax abatement agreement authority 
108. Business 
Regulation and 
Economic Development 
81st    HB 4525 Parker Establishing qualified 
manufacturing project zones  
109. Business 
Regulation and 
Economic Development 
81st  HB 4409 Taylor/ Restructuring the Texas 
Windstorm Insurance Association (TWIA) 
110. Criminal Justice 81st HB 498 McClendon State study on wrongful 
convictions 
111. Criminal Justice 81st * HB 1711 S. Turner Comprehensive offender 
reentry plan after prison release  
112. Criminal Justice 81st * HB 1736 Anchia Revising compensation for 
the wrongfully convicted (Tim Cole Act) 
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113. Criminal Justice 81st * HB 2003 McCall Making cyber-harassment a 
crime  
114. Criminal Justice 81st * HB 2066 Gallego Second- and third-degree 
felony for domestic violence strangulation  
115. Criminal Justice 81st * HB 2086 Moody Prosecution and punishment 
for gang activities  
116. Criminal Justice 81st    HB 2267 Hodge No death penalty for certain 
accomplices, separate trials for capital murder 
117. Criminal Justice 81st * HB 3228 Madden Detecting contraband and 
monitoring cell phones in correctional facilities 
118. Criminal Justice 81st * HB 3689 McClendon Continuing Texas 
Youth Commission, Texas Juvenile Probation 
Commission   
119. Elections 81st HB 2511 T. Smith Revising political 
contribution and expenditure restrictions 
120. Environment and 
Energy 
81st HB 395 Hartnett Repealing the state’s goal for 
generating capacity from natural gas  
121. Environment and 
Energy 
81st * HB 469 P. King/ HB1796 Chisum/   * SB 
1387 Seliger     Carbon dioxide capture and 
storage 
122. Environment and 
Energy 
81st    HB 836 S. Miller Hunting feral hogs by 
helicopter 
123. Environment and 
Energy 
81st    HB 1243 Gallego/ Sales of distributed 
renewable energy generation 
124. Environment and 
Energy 
81st       HB 1866 Solomons 
125. Environment and 
Energy 
81st    HB 1182 S. Turner Moving oversight of 
System Benefit Fund from Legislature to PUC  
126. Environment and 
Energy 
81st * HB 1796 Chisum/      SB 16 Averitt Revising 
state air pollution emissions-reduction 
programs 
127. Environment and 
Energy 
81st * HB 2259 Crownover Extending deadlines to 
plug inactive oil or gas wells 
128. Environment and 
Energy 
81st    HB 3245 Solomons Providing consumer 
protections in the restructured electric market  
129. Environment and 
Energy 
81st HB 1937 Villarreal Property assessments to 
finance energy-efficient improvements 
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130. Gaming 81st   HB 2081 Isett/ SB 1013 Hinojosa Continuing 
the Texas Racing Commission  
131. Government 
Affairs 
81st *HB 1831 Corte Emergency management, 
disaster preparedness, and school safety 
132. Government 
Affairs 
81st    HB 1976 Solomons Procedures for operating 
property owners’ associations 
133. Government 
Affairs 
81st * HB 2559 Truitt Employees Retirement 
System benefit and retirement eligibility  
134. Government 
Affairs 
81st HB 1831 Corte Emergency management, 
disaster preparedness, and school safety 
135. Government 
Affairs 
81st    HB 1976 Solomons Procedures for operating 
property owners’ associations 
136. Government 
Affairs 
81st * HB 2559 Truitt Employees Retirement 
System benefit and retirement eligibility  
137. Health 81st HB 5 Crownover/  SB 544 Ellis  Banning 
smoking in certain public and work places 
138. Health 81st * HB 1310 Solomons  Restricting use of indoor 
tanning facility devices by minors 
139. Health 81st * HB 1358 Keffer  Revisions to Cancer 
Prevention and Research Institute     
140. Health 81st    HB 1541 S. Turner  Extending Medicaid 
continuous eligibility  
141. Health 81st * HB 1672 Crownover/ * HB 1795 Pierson 
Newborn screening, retention of newborns’ 
genetic material 
142. Health 81st    HB 2962 Coleman/  SB 841 Averitt CHIP 
eligibility revisions; CHIP buy-in program 
143. Health 81st  SB 7 Nelson/  SB 8  Nelson/ SB 10  Duncan/* 
HB 1218 D. Howard/* HB 1218 D. Howard/* 
HB 4586 Pitts Pay-for-performance, other 
health care payment initiatives 
144. Health 81st SB 204 Shapleigh/  HB 1523 Alvarado Ban on 
foods with trans fats in certain establishments 
145. Health 81st    SB 1500 Duncan/  HB 3485  Coleman 
Employment of physicians by certain hospitals 
146. Health 81st HB 5 Crownover/  SB 544 Ellis  Banning 
smoking in certain public and work places 
147. Health 81st * HB 1310 Solomons  Restricting use of indoor 
tanning facility devices by minors 
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148. Health 81st * HB 1358 Keffer  Revisions to Cancer 
Prevention and Research Institute     
149. Health 81st    HB 1541 S. Turner  Extending Medicaid 
continuous eligibility  
150. Higher Education 81st * HB 51 Branch/   * HJR14 Corte Funding 
incentives to promote more tier-one research 
universities 
151. Higher Education 81st    HB 2083 Solomons Junior college employee 
group health insurance benefits  
152. Higher Education 81st    HB 3276 D. Howard Determining student 
priority in awarding TEXAS grants   
153. Higher Education 81st * HB 51 Branch/ * HJR14 Corte Funding 
incentives to promote more tier-one research 
universities 
154. Higher Education 81st    HB 2083 Solomons Junior college employee 
group health insurance benefits  
155. Higher Education 81st    HB 3276 D. Howard Determining student 
priority in awarding TEXAS grants   
156. Judiciary 81st HB 670 Martinez Fischer Qualified privilege 
for journalists not to testify  
157. Judiciary 81st HB 1657 Giddings Defining general contractor 
for workers’ compensation  
158. Public Education 81st * HB 3 Eissler School accountability and public 
school curriculum revisions 
159. Public Education 81st HB 130 Patrick Full-day prekindergarten for 
certain children 
160. Public Education 81st * HB 171 Olivo Mitigating factors in 
disciplining students 
161. Public Education 81st HB 710 Rose Sunset review of the State Board 
of Education 
162. Public Education 81st HB 2823 Patrick Excluding private schools 
from eligibility for certain TEA grants 
163. Public Education 81st * HB 3646 Hochberg Formula funding for 
public school finance, teacher pay raises 
164. Public Education 81st * HB 4294 Branch Buying electronic textbooks, 
materials, and technology 
165. Public Education 81st HJR 77 D. Howard/ HB 2037 D. Howard 
Replacing SBOE as managers of the Permanent 
School Fund 
166. Public Safety 81st * HB 55 Branch Prohibiting wireless device use 
while driving in a school zone 
167. Public Safety 81st * HB 339 Phillips Driver’s education and 
licensing requirements for minors 
168. Public Safety 81st * HB 537 Berman Requiring safety belts for 
minors in passenger vehicles  
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169. Public Safety 81st SB 1164 Wentworth/ HB 1893 Driver Allowing 
certain licensees to carry weapons on college 
campuses  
170. Public Safety 81st * HB 2730 Kolkhorst Continuing Department 
of Public Safety, Private Security Board 
171. Taxation and 
Revenue 
81st * HB 8 Otto Comptroller property value study 
and appraisal district review 
172. Taxation and 
Revenue 
81st * HB 770 D. Howard Homestead exemption for 
damaged homes; Open Beaches Act 
173. Taxation and 
Revenue 
81st exception; property-tax exemption for 
chambers of commerce 
174. Taxation and 
Revenue 
81st HB 982 Thompson/ HB 2070 Cohen Raising 
revenue from sexually oriented businesses 
175. Taxation and 
Revenue 
81st * HB 1038 Paxton Including foreclosed homes 
in homestead property appraisals 
176. Taxation and 
Revenue 
81st * HB 1801 Bohac Adding certain backpacks 
and school supplies to sales-tax holiday 
177. Taxation and 
Revenue 
81st * HB 2154 Edwards Physician education loan 
repayment program; tobacco products tax 
178. Taxation and 
Revenue 
81st * HB 3611 Otto/ * HB 3612 Otto/* HB 3613 
Otto/Property appraisal revisions 
179. Taxation and 
Revenue 
81st * HB 3613 Otto Disabled veterans’ exemption 
from property taxation 
180. Taxation and 
Revenue 
81st * HB 4765 Oliveira Revising small business 
exemption from business margins tax 
181. Transportation 81st * HB 1 (1st) Pitts Issuing general obligation 
bonds for highway improvements  
182. Transportation 81st HB 300 Isett Continuing and revising the Texas 
Department of Transportation 
183. Transportation 81st * HB 3097 McClendon Creating Dept. of 
Motor Vehicles; regulating auto parts recyclers  
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APPENDIX B 
 
CODING PROTOCOL FOR STATE LEGISLATIVE HEARINGS 
(Adapted from Walsh 2002 and Minta 2011) 
 
(1) Determine type of statements used. Statements may include legislators’ 
opening statements, verbal exchanges between legislators and witnesses, 
verbal exchanges between or among legislators, bill explanation, and verbal 
requests regarding bill information. 
a. Policy Related Language is coded  
i. Does not include procedural/administrative/One word 
statements 
1. Statements regarding Roberts Rules of Order Ex. “The 
chair recognizes” 
2. Introduction of witnesses, such as “Hello Mr…”, “Mr. 
Moak is here on behalf of  ...” 
3. “Yes” “No” 
(2) Policy Related Language. Policy related language can relate to the statement or 
question that defines/explains the bill after its initial reading, expresses policy 
preferences, factual statements to support or against the bill, impact 
statements, statements or questions made to witnesses or other legislators.  
a. If legislators are identified as using policy related language, then the 
following coding scheme is used to assess the language. 
i. Minority Interest Policy Question(s) or Statement(s) 
1. Question or Statement 
2. These are questions, answers, or statements made by 
a representative related specifically to the policy which 
mentions a minority interest frame i.e. impact, detail, 
rules, or explanation.   
ii. Non-Minority Interest Policy Question(s) or Statement(s) 
1. Question or Statement 
2. These are questions, answers, or statements made by 
a representative related specifically to the policy with 
no mention of a minority interest frame i.e. impact, 
detail, rules, or explanation.   
(3) Non-Policy Related Language. These are administrative or procedural comments 
made to help facilitate the meeting. 
i. Factual Question(s) or Statement(s) 
1. Are not directly related to the bill impact or details but 
may be based on responses to questions, procedure 
and/or witness testimony. 
2. Also occurs when the legislator is answering a question 
or making a statement that is not recognizable as 
policy related; examples include "yes" "thank you" etc. 
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(4) Bill Explanation 
1. When bill facts are clarified and no opinion from the 
representatives expressed 
2. This is usually when the Chair, Bill author, legislator, or 
person providing public testimony is directly explaining or 
defining parts of the bill 
 
 
The following information is also required coding: 
 
Date The date of the committee hearing 
    Member  Representative that is speaking 
    Public 
Witness 
The person that is standing giving public testimony usually says there 
name and where they are from (record this information) 
Session This is recorded as the number of sessions that have occurred on the same 
day, because sometimes they adjourn for lunch and I want to account for 
the number of sessions regarding the bill on the same day 
Round  This is the dialogue (a conversation) that occurs between members and/or  
persons giving testimony - please record the language spoken for them as 
well 
  So for example if West is talking to Shapiro and he makes a 
statement then she makes a statement, (this is round 1) 
  Therefore round 1 is the first conversation that happens at the 
beginning of a committee hearing and so on  
  Keep in mind that there can be multiple people in a round 
because people interject on a conversation often 
Time  Record the time (it can be approximate) that legislators start conversations 
(this can be tricky) and make require you to start and stop the transcript 
often.  
  This is the time as shown on the online video 
   Addressee  Who is the person talking to (put "all" if a person is not talking directly to 
anyone) 
 
Additional Instructions 
 
(1) Participants may make long statements that may contain multiple categories – 
minority interest question, minority interest statement, etc. When this occurs, 
the language is coded in subparts. 
(2) If legislators show up to the hearings but do not speak record their name. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
Please note that a problem that arose with estimating the models are regarding 
repeat observations in the data. Because I pooled the deliberation and participation data 
from different committees in the three Texas legislative sessions that held the minority 
interest and non-minority interest committee hearings, there were legislators who served 
on more than one committee and therefore appear more than once in the sample. In the 
78
th
 session deliberation and participation chapter sample, Representative Eissler served 
on both the Human Services and Public Education. Representative Eissler is a member of 
both committees therefore he participated and engaged on bills heard during the 
committee hearing deliberations.  As a result he appears in the data sample more than 
once. This is the case for legislators that are on multiple committees or on a committee in 
the sample that has more than one bill examined during the same session, in addition to 
legislators that are members on a committee but did not participate or attend. 
Consequently, the standard maximum likelihood assumption that all observations are 
independent is violated. If I did not correct for the independence violation and continued 
with ordinary estimation procedures, the standard errors in the results would be incorrect 
(Greene 2000). The correction for the repeat observations is done using clustered 
standard errors, which relax the independence assumption among observations in the data 
and produce correct standard errors (Minta 2011).  
 
 
 
 
 
  
139 
 
Appendix D 
 
Minorities in Texas 
 
Session African 
Americans 
Caucasia
ns 
Latinos Asian 
American
s 
House 
Democrats 
House 
Republican
s 
Senate 
Democrats  
Senate 
Republic
ans 
House 
Males 
Hous
e 
Fema
les 
Senate 
Males 
Senate 
Female
s 
82
nd
 
(2011) 
(14)    49 101 12 19 118 32 25 6 
81
st
 
(2009) 
(14)  (29)  74 76 12 19 113 37 25 6 
80
th
 
(2007) 
(13)  (30)  69 80 11 20 117 32 27 4 
79
th 
(2005) 
(14)  (29)  63 86 12 19 118 31 27 4 
78
th
 16 (14) 127 
(105) 
37 (30) 1 (1) 62 88 12 19 118 32 27 4 
77
th
 16 (14) 130 
(108) 
34 (27) 0 78 72 15 16 120 30 27 4 
76
th
 16 (14) 130 
(108) 
35(28) 0 78 72 15 16 121 29 28 3 
75
th
 16 (14) 129 
(108) 
35 (28) 0 82 68 14 16 121 29 28 3 
74th 16 (14) 131 
(109) 
33 (26) 0 87 63 14 17 121 29 27 27 
Texas Legislature Online (2011) 
Parenthesis () represent the number(s) in the lower chamber. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
